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PREFACE
There are as many interpretations as there are writers on the
positions of American foreign policy during the diplomatic negotia
tions with Japan in 1941.

Hi.storians supporting President Roosevelt's

position tend to blame Japan 1 s imperialism and expansionism as one
of the main causes of the war.

Revisionist historians like Charles

Beard, Harry Elmer Barnes, and Charles Tansill, place the
responsibility for Japan's declaration of war and surprise attack on
the intransigent approach of the Roosevelt administration.

To place

the full burden of responsibility for the failure of negotiations on
either Japan or the United States is to over--simplify the complex
events of 1941.

The value of the historfral writings supporting Presi

dent Roosevelt's posit:on is thej_r explanation of Japan 1 s aims and
purposes in the Far East, while the revisionist's significant contribu
tion is their critique of the method and principles of American foreign
policy in the Far East.
In this study an attempt will be made to give a balanced explana
tion of the diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan,
and to examine the reasons why both Japan and the United States
failed to reach a negotiated settlement.
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CHAPTER I

AMERICAN - JAPANESE RELATIONS IN THE
NINETEENTH AND EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY

:!!!'!I th

id JOOOls, .Jap

was @P j59]atsd rati2r

Jiving
a..

within its ancient cultural heritage, untarnished by Western tradi-

------

tions.

Living in the traditional manner, she possessed neither the

Western sense of morality, justice, and democracy nor the economic,
military, and political power of the Western Powers.

Except for

admitting the annual Dutch boat, which visited Nagasaki harbor,
Japan pursued a policy of avoiding contact with Western nations.
Traders of Western nations, among them the United States,
voyaged to the Far East in the 1830's to open ports of trade.

As

early as 1832, Edmund Roberts, an American official, traveled to
the Far East to seek a treaty with Japan, but he died on the way.
Fourteen years later, Commodore James Biddle, under instructions
from the American government, tried unsuccessfully to open negotia
tions for a treaty of commerce with the Japanese. 1 The factors
_motivating American interest were: The well-being of shipwrecked
1 Alexander DeConde, A History of American Foreign Policy
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1963), p. 234.

1

2
American sailors wh� had been maltreated; possible coaling stations
for the newly-emerging steamships; and the need for markets. 1
On July 8, 1853, Commodore Matthew C. Perry, the younger
brother of the hero of the Battle of Lake Erie, sailed into the Bay
of Yedo (Tokyo) where he made representatiqns for a treaty, giving
the Japanese until SP'ring to make a reply.

In February, when

Perry returned with more gunboats, the rulers of Nippon were pre
pared to negotiate because they were aware of the overwhelming
Western military strength which had played a significant part in
suppressing the Chinese in the Opium War on the mainland.

On

March 13, 1854, a treaty of Amity and Commerce was signed, by
which the Amer leans were permitted to establish a consulate in
Japan, the ports of Shimada and Hakodate were opened for trade,
Japan was bound to respect and return sailors, and most favored
nation treatment was accorded. 2
Townsend Harris, a New York merchant of ability who was
appointed the first American Consul General in Japan, pursued a
policy of persistence to further break down Japanese isolation. The
result was the Harris Treaty of July 29, 1858, which opened four
1

Fred W. Wellborn, Diplomatic History of the United States

(Patt�rson, New Jersey:
p. 142.

2

Ibid., pp. 142-43.

Littlefield, Adams and Company, 1961),

3

additional ports, permitted Americans to live in Toyko for trade purposes, g.:::_anted the right of extra-territoriality, and provided for the
exchange of ministers. 1
As a result of the Shimonoseki Affair of 1863 in which a feudal
baron attempted to close the Straits of Shimonoseki, Great Britian,
France, Holland and the United States intervened and Japan was
forced to pay a three million dollar indemnity. 2 � of
Japan reali_z� tbat _if _s_g_s:h---.h9m°!JardmentsI indemnity pay� and
co�sions were to he avoided in the future they bad to build their
.own counter-power.

With_ determination and a facile ability for

�i�n-ew skills and teclrnieiues, �n to westernize.

West

ern nations aided in her development, not forseeing that Japan might
one day possess the power to threaten Western dominance in Asi4.
A Japanese naval training school was opened in 1855.

Americans

viewed the Japanese buildup as protection against European imperialism.

-

------

The United States, rather than a European nation was chosen

----

to play the role of teacher. 3 The Japanese government instructed
members of its embassy in Washington to study naval yard operations,
the casting of cannons, and operational procedures. 4 By the 1870' s
1DeConde, p. 237.
2Wellborn, p. 144.
3william Neumann, America Encounters Japan (:-(3altimore:
The John Hopkins Press, 1963), p. 75.
4
Ibid. , p. 76.

4
the Japanese Navy was
serviceable force,

11

11 • • •

rapidly h1creaijed into quite a large and

wrote American Minister to Japan, Charles E.

Delong, to the Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish. 1
Japanese naval personnel were also trained in American.
tween 1870 and 1906, Japanese ensigns studied at Annapolis.

Be

After

the latter date Congress became concerned about espionage, and
closed the Naval Academy to foreigners.

Also the Naval Academy

send An+erican graduates to serve in Japan in different capacities.
Furthermore, educators, engineer$, agricultural experts and, to a
lesser e�tent, missionaries also aided in the westernization process. 2
Alfred Thayer Mahan' s The Influence of Sea Power on History,
wh�ch was translated into Japanese, became an important referenc&
book for both the United States and Japan.

Mahan's main theme,

that naval expansion and commercial growth are complimentary, was
important to a nation which was composed of islands and which was
dependent on the seas as the main artery of transportation.
As national consciousness and power grew with economic,
educational and military p:rogress, unpleasant aspects of Japanese
national aspirations began to appear.

In 1876, imitating Perry's

tactics, Japan secured trade agreements with China and Korea by a
1 Quoted in Neumann, p. 78.
2

!bid., pp. 80-85.

5
show of force in their harbors.

By the 1880' s success in diplomacy

increased the confidence of the leaders of Japan. 1

Despite the in-

creasing Japanese role in Far Eastern affairs, the American press
showed little hostility toward Nippon. _In the Sino-Japane§__e W...a. LS!.i._
1894, American opinion :(4yQI...ed Japan while the offi.cial American
position was one of neutrality. 2

----

Around-the turn of the centur_yi..J!ie two dramatic developments

-----------

rela!�d t_� American foreign policy in the Far East were the acquisi- tion of a Pacific Empire and the Open Door Policy.

Concerned with

the scramble for spheres of influence by Europeans nations, Secretary of State John Hay issued a series of statements in 1899 and 1900
which were designed to promote American economic interests without
the necessity of acquiring territorial possessions in China.

The

O_pE:_n p_oor notes, sent in 1899

---

-

and navigation in all of China including the spheres of interest held
� foreign powers.

In 1900 Hay announced the United States would

seek to safeguard the territorial and administrative integrity of
China.

Hay's policy was based on the assumption of what Brooks
1
Ibid. ,

2

p. 99.

Ibid., p. 104.

6
Adams

called "America's economic supremacy.111 In August, 1901

Broo\<s ,A.dams wrote:
There seems no reason to doubt that as time goes on,
America will drive Europe more from neutral markets
. . . America's attack is based not only on her superior
resources and her more perfect administration but on her
2
tariff.
Hay's policy was

not designed to create a colonial relationship

but rather to permit the United States to compete with the rising
empire of Japan for markets and raw materials in China.

Inevitably

both nations would interpret that interest in China as essential to the

well-being of their respective national interests.

T_h_e first serious confrontatio��--be!__we�Japan and America

�ccurred when the United States acquired Hawaii and the Philippines.
Tokyo protested that these acquisitions would disrupt the status quo

in the Pacific and would endanger the residential and commercial
rights of Japanese citizens in these territories. 3

In the chauvinistic spirit characteristic at the turn of the century, both Japan and

Pacific fleets.

the United States continued to expand their

Some Americans began to fear that the Nipponese

)

f

1William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplo
macy (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1959), p. 43.

2Quoted in William Appleman Williams, ed., The Shaping of
American Diplomacy, 1905-1955 (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1956),
II, 484-86,
3

Neumann, pp. 113-15.

7
Navy pas&essed sufficient offensive power to attack American posses
�io11s,

1

Afte:r signing an alliance with Japan, in 1902, Great Britain

reduced its Pacific squadron, virtually giving

11 its

adherence to a

Japanes� political principle in the Far East equivalent to the Monroe
Dqctrine to the United States. 11 2 Meanwhile the United States was
�tea,dj.ly building up it� naval power.

From 1901 to 1909, the Ameri-

can !itanding, among the world's fleets moved from fifth to second
Tokyo regarded the American possessions in the Pacific

posiFpn,

as pp�sible arsenals and bases for an attack against Japan. 3
Furth�:rmqre increasing anti-Japanese sentiments on the west
of the United States did little to improve relations between the
countries.

In

�pite of these factors, the American political and business

communitie� endorsed and aided Japan in the Russo-Japanese War
which �nded in 1905.

Kuhn, Loeb, and Company, a New York

ban,king fiii:rn issued a series of war bonds to support Japan. 4 The
only ·.A;i:actioal alternative to Russian power in the Far East was
11

at tpat time the Japanese power, not Chinese. 115

The

1Ibid., pp. 115-16.
2Ibtd., pp. 118-20.
3

Ibid., p. 120.
--.---.-

4

Kuhn, Loeb and Company was a Jewish firm which may have
aided Japa11, because of the anti-Jewish Russian pogroms. Neumann,
p. 1i2.
5

<;:ieorge :f. Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (Chicago:
The Univer�ity of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 41.

8

belliger ents accepte d
shire ,

where

European

Ame r ican

med iation

at

Port smouth, New Hamp

a peace treaty was signed in 1905.

nation

to be

defeated

by

an Asiatic

power, lost

in the Pacific, ceding to Japan the

southern half

ni z ing

Korea,

Japa n' s prima ry position

in

arid

concess ions in Southern Manchuria . 1
In th e

s ummer

Taro Katsura, i n Tokyo, a nd

with

of Sakhalin,

position
recog-

giving up rights

and

Japanese Pr i me Minister

drafted a

Japan' s control of Korea in

aspirations i n

her

of 1905, Theodore Roosevelt' s Secretary of

State, W illiam Howard Taft, met

acce pt

Russia, the first

mem oran du m

retu rn

agreeing

for Japanese

to

d isa vowal

of

the Philippines . 2 Three years later, o_n November 30,

· --------

s-=s�ig�n=e�
d�,�
in which J�
apan an
the
���a�k�a
=h==-ir�a
=-...:A
:..=.i.g�r�e=e�m:=..e�n
�t::,__;w�a
=
:.:_ :..:..=.:: =�
� :.....::.. E �=.:....:= :..::�

U nited States

a greed

to

ma iota in the existing status quo in the Paci-

f c
to
p ct t
territorial poss
-gion,
----------i

the

re

res e

region and

to

essions

he

s uppo rt

integrity of China . 3 One

b

acific

means the

of each othe..i:_ in

inde endence

writer s tates :

Our government found little difficulty in reconciling
itself to the establishment of Japanese predo m inance in
Korea. And the Taft-Kats ura and Root-Takahira
1

Ne umann, p. 123.

2 De Conde, p. 370.
3

W ellbor n, p. 233.

a nd

tJ\i,,J•i J
�

j

9
agreements of 1905-1908, respectively, whatever they
may have meant to us, surely meant to the Japanese an
implicit recognition of the position they have acquired
in Ma,.nchuria. 1

Japanese immigration into the United States stirred lively

*

opposition on the West Coast in the early years of the Twentieth
Century.

At the height of anti-Nipponese agitation, the San Fran

cisco Board of Education segregated oriental and caucasian students.
Japan's sense of national honor was ·deeply hurt.

Sensational news

papers spread anti-oriental propaganda, especially the widely read
Hearst newspapers.

President Theodore Roosevelt dealt with the

problem by persuading the school board to rescind its order and
securing the Gentlemen's Agreement of 1907 with Japan in which
the latter agreed not to issue passports to laborers destined for the
United States. 2

Relations between the two countries were deterior-

ating in spite of the Gentlemen I s Agreement.

In 1907 the United

States Navy turned down a Japanese offer to establish closer rela- }
tions and to exchange information as Jap4µ was doing with its
British ally.

In the following year, the Great White Fleet traveled

around the world, including a stopover in Tokyo where. President
Roosevelt hoped that a,. show of American power would act as a

1 Kennan, p. 42.
2

Wellborn, p. 231.

10
deterrent to Japan's expanding aspirations.

A correspondent for the

Chicago Tribune reported that,
The fleet made a vivid and far-reaching impression
it caused the Japanese to realize the formidable power
of the United States as nothing else would possil:>ly have
1
done.
Luckily, the American sailorij were warmly welc;omed in Japan.
During the era of "Dollar Diplomacy," E. H. Harriman, an
American railroad promoter, planned to construct a railroad in
Manchuria and China which would be part of a world-wide network.
However, Japan refused to approve this plan as she did not welcome
the prospect of a rival in Manchuria, which she considered her
sphere of influence.
Another significant factor in the relations between the United
*
States and Japan, was America's growing interest in China.

Busi-

ness investments had grown from $20,000,000 in 1900 to $50,000,000
in 1914.

Twenty-five hundred missionaries had come to China whereas

their counterparts were fewer numerically in Japan.

After the Chinese

Revolution of 1911 and the establishmept of a republic; on the mainland,
a pro-Chinese American foreign policy emerged because of the great '

/

missionary zeal, and the bright lucrative economic prospects offered
by the Chinese market.
1

Simultaneousl JapaA'.s growing ?�vy�merging

Quoted in DeConde, p. 372.

11

·-- ------

nationalism, and exclusion of American interest in Manchuria did

---·---

.

a· anese rela�_with Washington. 1

-·--·

Japan joined the allies in World War I, and with the help of
Britain, seized the German possessions on the Shantung Peninsula,
its chief port of Kiachow, and the German islands in the Pacific.
Mahan viewed this as a blow to American power.
Assistant

He wrote to

Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt, that the

acquisition of German possesssions in the Pacific 11 ••• is one
thing in the·hands of a power whose main strength is in Europe, and
quite another that they should pass into the hands of one ·so near as
Japan. 112 Japanese occupation of Shantung brought charges in Con
gress that Japan had violated the Open Door Policy. 3 Also in

��

�

January 1915, Japan took advantage of the war to promote her interest
in China by presenting the "Twenty-One Demands" which called for
official Chinese sanction of Japanese economic activities in the
Shantung Peninsula, Southern Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and in
mining areas of the Yangtze Valley.

At the insistence of the United

States, these demands were somewhat modified. 4

1 Neumann, p. 137.
2

Quoted in Neumann, p. 143.

3 Neumann, p. 143.

4

DeConde, p. 416.

12
At the peace conference, Japan· wanted confirmation of her
claim to the German possessions she had seized in the War, equal
status with the other great powers, and a statement of racial
equality.

The Allies and the United States refused to put a statement

of racial equality in the treaty and Woodrow Wilson insisted that the
former German islands be given to Japan only under a League of
Nations mandate.

When Japan threatened to walk out of the confer-

ence, Wilson and the Chinese representative recognized, under
protest, Japan I s right to Shantung.

Since the Senate did not ratify

the Treaty of Versailles, these provisions were never formally
_
recognized by the United States. 1 However the Japanese could
rely on the Lansing-Ishii Agreement of 1917 in which the United
States recognized Japan's

II special

relations II with, anq

II special

interests" in, China in return for a secret protocol respecting the
rights and privileges of other friendly nations in China.
During the Twenties, tensions decreased due to the decline
cost of
-j._g_Japaoese militarism, post-war disillusionment, the-�high
-----rise of international cooperation.
The aggressive military leaders were forced to acquiesce.

In this

period of retrenchment and economic development, a series of
agreements was signed with respect to the Far East at the Washington
Conference, called by the United States in 1921.
1
Ibid. , p. 4 76.

13

@

Great Britain, France, Japan, and the United States signed

The Four-Power Treaty of December 13, 1921, which bound the
signatories to respect each others' insular possessions in the
Pacific; to submit disputes not settled by diplomacy to joint confer
ences; to communicate with one another if threatened by an out
sider; to abrogate .the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which had been
renewed in 1911 for the last time.

The life of the treaty was to be

ten years, after which it could be terminated on one year's notice. 1

lJ

The Five-Power Treaty, signed on February 6, 1922, pro

vided that no capital ships could be constructed for ten years,
afterwhich replacements might begin; total capital ship tonnage was
not to exceed 522,000 each for Great Britain and the United States,
315,000 for Japan, and 175,000 for each France and Italy; the
United States, Great Britain, and Japan bound themselves to refrain
from fortifying insular possessions in the Western Pacific; and the
treaty was to remain in force until December 31, 1936. 2

<!.J

All the conference members signed The Nine-Power Treaty on

February 6, 1922, which bound the signatories to respect the sover
eignity, the independence, and the territorial and administrative
integrity of China; to refrain from taking advantage of conditions in
China to seek special rights and privileges; and to respect the Open
1DeConde, p. 499.
2

Wellborn, pp. 291-92.

14
Door.

The secret portion of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement was abro-

gated. Also the United States secured cable rights on Yap Island, in
return for which Japan's mandates over the Carolinas, Mariannas,
and Marshalls were recognized. Japan also signed a treaty with
China for the return of Shantung. 1
In 1927, Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg and French
Foreign Minister Auguste Briand expanded a proposed treaty between
France and the United States into a multinational pact, outlawing war.
By signing the Kellogg-Briand Pact in August, 1925, the original
fifteen signatories, including Japan, pledged to renounce war as an
instrument of irrational policy and to seek solutions to international

--

disputes by peaceful means.
However, the cooperative spirit which had been dominant in
the 1920 1 s was rudely shattered by the world-wide conomic collapse

--·

Japan reverted
which began as the decade of the 1930'
s - dawned.
--- · ---·- . .
----- -·-- .

States and Japan entered upon a new era.

1
Ibid., p. 292.

0

CHAPTER II

DECLINE OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, 1929-1940

After the stock market crash of 1929, which caused a serious
economic and social upheaval, American-Japanese relations rapidly
-·-

-- - ------------ ----------------�

deteriorated.

Some factions i

Tokyo, particularly the Japanese

army, desired an aggressive foreign policy.

Their hand was

strengthened when the United States imposed the Hawley-Smoot
tariff which curtailed Japanese imports to the United States. With
the rise of Chinese nationalism on the mainland, the Chinese army

\

harassed the Japanese in their Manchurian sphere of influence. The '
Japanese Kwangtung army, in need of a significant military victory,

\
\

boldly seized the opportunity to attack and to annex Manchuria in
1931, consequently setting it up as a sovereign state under the name
of Manchukuo1 in February, 1932. 2 In Japan, individuals who
opposed military expansion were branded as "corrupt politicians
or selfish financial magnates. 3
1

Manchukuo m�ans Manchu country.

2

Mamoru Shigemistu, Japan and Her Destiny: My Struggle for
Peace (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1958), pp. 59-66.
3Shigenori Togo, The Cause of Japan (New York: Simon
Schuster, 1956), p. 23.

15

I

16
which had been appointed to

When the Lytton commission

investigate for the League of Nation$, recommended that Manchuria
be restored to China, Japan in refusing, asserted that her interest
would not be served by this course of action because of the anarchy
in China and because of the hostility of the Chinese government.
Japan withdrew from the League of Nations in March,

1933, after

being condemned by a vote of censure. 1
Chinese reaction to the "Manchuria Incident" stirred up antiJapanese sentiments in Shanghai.

The lives and property of thirty

thousand Japanese were threatened.

Ten thousand soldiers and

sailors from Japan were dispatched to quell the riot and to protect
Japanese citizens.

Finally in May,

1932, when Japan and China

agreed to a truce, Nipponese forces were withdrawn and conditions
returned to normal. 2

� On January 7,

1932, American policy towards Manchuria

took the form of the Hoover-Stimson doctrine, which stated, in effect ,
that the United States would not recognize the legality of any l'.:hange
which impaired its rights in China or which violated treaty agreements
including the Kellogg-Briand Pact. 3
1
Neumann, p.

187-93.

2Shigemitsu, pp. 76-79.
3
Neumann, p. 194.

The Kellogg-Briand Pact

17
outlawed war as an instrument of national policy.

At this early date

Stimson was contemplating economic boycott against Japan but it was
not applied for fear of an extremist reaction in Japan. The incoming
Roosevelt government also refused to recognize Manchukuo.
Unlike the United States, where the �e_p_a_!a_tiQ!?-__o_f duties be-

--.---··

---

-· ·-� -----..

-----·

tween the military and civilian powers are clearly defined and where
.

,_.....

...

-•--- ·---·----------------

the transfer of power fro

--- -

-

_on
. e--e-l-e-creclgc5v-e-TBWent to a.no.th-er is

peaceful, Japan had an unstable political balance.

Between 1931 and
\

!��here we:-:ven diff:rent Japa==

In April 1931,

\

Premier Hamagushi was assassinated and in March 1932, Premier
Inukai met the same fate.

11

That was the end of party government.

By terrorism the government 1 s defenses had been breached.

/

There

was no longer any direct obstacle to the maneuvers of the military. ,,l

'

\

Assassination threats from nee-military factions, reactionary parties
and ultra-nationalists menaced moderate leaders.

Between 1932 and

1936, the governments headed by Saito and Okada were referred to
as navy cabinets because the two Premiers were important navy
leaders.2

----

·-- -

In February, 1936, young officers desiring reform and power

----

--------·-- � . --�-·

began a rebellion.

-- ---------------

---

Lieutenant-General Nagata was assassinated in

-------- ----·

the War Ministry because of the dismissal of Gen,eral Masaka,
1

Shigemitsu, p. 81.

2
Ibid., p. 85.

18
Director of Military Training who was a popular idol of the young
officers.
When the Tokyo Division of the army was ordered to proceed t
Manchukuo, the young officers felt the move was designed to get rid
of the disfavored officers and they rebelled. Three cabinet ministers were murdered, Prime Minister Okada survived only because

--

the assassins killed his cousin who looked like him. The rest of

·----

the Cabinet resigned. The rebels wanted a reform governmel}t led
by the army and a cabinet formed by General Masaka. The revolt

---- ·�•- --

was quelled by February 29, 1936. Those leaders who did not
commit suicide were court martialed. 1 The succeeding Hirota and
Hayashi governments were weak.

"The Hirota Cabinet was little

more than a tool of the military. 112
The Supreme Command, free from government control, was )
made up of the a.rmy and navy leaders. Plans against potential
enemies were prepared. The I}avy had little use for the army's
emphasis on North China while the army felt that a southern advance

was dangerous. A compromise of moving southward from Northern
China was finally agreed to. However the Prime Minister was not
informed, for this was considered a service matter.

1Ibid., pp. 105-06.
2

Ibid., pp. 108-13.

19
In 1934 the Arnau declaration, aimed at restoring friendly ties
with China, was enunciated.

Japan planned: to forego any moves

into China proper while paying special heed to the "Open Door" policy;
to encourage foreign nations both to help China restrain her antiJapanese sentiments and to withhold war munitions; and to recognize
that both countries were threatened by communism.

While this

plan was approved by the cabinet, the Kwantung Army in North China
ignored the declared policy of the government. 1 Also the army was
carrying on its own negotiations with the German government.

The

Japanese military attache' in Berlin was pro-German, anticommunist, and anti-American. The modern army had been built
on a German model and most Japanese leaders had studied in Germany. Through the initiative of Lieutenant-Colonel Oshima, and
without the full knowledge of the Japanese Ambassador in Germany,
Japan negotiated and signed the Anti-Comintern Pact in November,
1936.

There really were two governments in Japan--the Cabinet

and the Supreme Command (General Staff), each running the country
independently of the other until October, 1941, when Premier
Hideki Tojo co-ordinated the affairs of the two.2
The rise of militarism, political instability in Japan, and the

-----

--- - -

,.

withdrawal of Japan from the League of Nations did not contribute
1Ibid., p. 98.
2
Ibid., p. 122.

20

----

to good relations w ith the United States. The United States clearly

- ---- - ---·

tended to be partial towards China in the

1930' s.

Pearl Buck's book, The Good Earth, which was the basis of
a film, reached a wide audience in the United States and promoted
a sympathetic view of the Chinese peasant.
was at a low ebb.

Th� Japanese image

The success of missionaries in converting many

Chinese to Christianity, especially Chiang Kai-Khek and the impor
tant Soong family, were without parallel in Japan. 1

The American

press was generally anti-Japanese. 2
In the State Department, Stanley K. Hornbeck, Chief of Far

--- --- ------·

Eastern Division, who was anti-Japanese, was extremely influen_,...

tial in the formulation of American foreign policy in the Far East.

-

As early as
Japan.

1931,

he was in favor of economic sanctions against

Two years later he stated that his government would not

recognize "governments by swords."

American Ambassador to

Japan Joseph C. Grew, replied that such statements were not con
ducive to the easing of tensions in the Pacific.

3

From

1937

to

1941,

after he was relieved of his position, Hornbeck continued to be
influential as the Advisor on Political Relations to the Secretary of
State.

1 Neumann, p. 15.
2

3

Ibid., p. 209.

rbid., pp.

193--201.
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President Roosevelt had sentimental ties with China; his grandfather was involved in the China Trade.

Henry L. Stimson, former

Secretary of State under President Hoover and later Secretary of War
for President Roosevelt, stated that the President had a

11•

per-

sonal hereditary interest" in China. 1 "Unquestionably our relations
to the peoples of the Far East had been colored by a certain senti
mentality towards the Chinese. 112 Furthermore, as a former Assistant Secretary of the Navy and as a lover of ships, the President
was interested in a powerful American navy.

-----

On June 16, 1933,

... -- ·---

$238, 000, 000 of the National Recov�_:J_�d�i��s�ation funds were
alloted to a naval builidng program.

Tokyo and other foreign capi

.Jals felt that the Unitec;l_Sti?,t�s ��d _reopenE:!d the �cl:_yal_ra5.e. 3

The

Japanese cabinets led by Premi_ers Saito and Okada between 1932
and 1936, as has been noted, were commonly referred to as the
naval cabinets.

After President Roosevelt announced a massive

naval rebuilding program, the Japanese government, following suit, \
/
seized upon this opportunity to increase naval appropriations and to)\
plan the building of twenty-two ships. 4
1Quoted in Neumann, p. 200.
2
Kennan, p. 49.
3 Neumann, p. 201.
4

Ibid. , p. 204.
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j) l
Economic factors also contributed to increasing enmity between ----!,J
�

--------- -- -----

�- .

·------------

the United States and Japan.

,,,.-------------

Although the two countries had lucra-

tive trade agreements, the China market, with its larger population
which seemed to offer an unlimited potential for American exports,
was alluring to the United States.

One writer in 1932 stated:

Our interest in China today is not due to any altruis
tic urge . . . it is dictated by the insistent demand of trade
in the Far East and by the strong hold which the markets of
China have always exel'ted upon the American imagination. 1
Any Japanese invasion and occupation of terrritory on the mainland of China meant elimination or at least a diminution of American
trade in that territory.

Manchukuo I s exports to the United States

declined from $14,600,000 in 1932, to $7,710,000 in 1936.

By 1940,

the decline in trade was even greater. 2 Furthermore, Japan emerg�d

------

_ as one of America I s chief c9m:
-pet.ito..l".s_Lr�_Joreign
-·--- markets and

-

--- ---- -

--

thr atened American manufacturers in the United States.
In 1933, a naval conference was held in London to discuss the
·--

- -----

--

Washington Treaty__o�_ � 922 and the London Treaty of 1930.
···--·-

-----

The navy

cabinet wanted parity with the United States and England in the tonnage
ratio of capital ships. 3 When delegates from the United States and
1Foster Rhea Dulles, America in the Pacific (Boston and New
York: l-!pughton-Mifflin Co. , 1932), p. 1.
2

Thomas A. Bisson, American Policy in the Far East, 1931-1940
(New York: institute of Pacific Relations, 1940), p. 96.
3Un.der the Treaty of Washington (1921) the Japanese had agreed
to hold its capital ships to a total tonnage of about three -fifths that of
British and United States fleets.

Great Britain r�fused, Japan
after serving notice of her intention to
.- - -
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-

abrogate the treaty, withdrew from the conference. 1 §_hl�enori Togp,

�---------·----•--.. ----- . -

a diplomat who was _t_o_ become Foreign Minister, opposed the abroga

tion of the treaty, claiming that ". . . an armaments race leading

to a J�panese-American war- -would ultimately bring about a world

·---·--------

war. 112 The United States navy held manoeuvers west of Hawaii.\

::;:;: the announcement of the abrogation of the naval treaties Japan)
viewed this move as an intimidation.

The next yea;r, Japan signe0

the Anti ... Comintern Pact with Germany.

In July, l 93 7, _ _a cabinet headed by Prince Fuminaro Konoye,

a well liked moderate, su<;:<;::eeded the Hayashi government. 3 On
July 7,

-

.....

-

1937,
Japanese and_fhinese
troops clashed near the Marco
---. . . . ----·

th�ir hated enemy.

But Jap�n was also to blame.

-- -----------

Japan might well have displayed patience and pru
de�ce; �he should have never stirred beyond Manchuria.
Ip.stead, the incompetence of the government, and the

recklessness of the army intrigues in North China led
her on . . . If we study the reason [fo;r the war with China,],
it is that Japan's political system broke down. 4
1Shigem.itsu, p. 91.

2 Togo, p. 31.

�Konoye was Premier.until 1939. He also led a second cabinet
from July 22, 1940, to July 17, 1941, and a third government from
July 18, 1941, to October 16, 1941.
4
Shigemitsu, p.

139.
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Whil� its troops invaded China, Japan referring to this Hght as the

------ --·- - �

-·

"China Incident,

11

did not declare war formally because this would

have violated her pledge in t�e :K� 1� o�g- �ria�d Pact �nd would haJe
_
_
_
- -

--

------------------

cut pff the �ale of United States war material to Japan.
. ..

-� ..

/

On October 5,

1937, when Pre1:1ident Roosevelt made his fa�ous "Quarantine The
Dictators" speech, isolationist feeling in the United States caused
i)im to postpone this idea for the time beins, 1 Japan, q>mpletely·
2.

isplateq, was condemned by the League of Nations for violating the)
Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. 2 On December 12,
1937, Japaµes� planes zeroed in on the U, S. S. Panay and three
' '

Standard Oil tankers on the Yangtze River.

While the Japanese

gpvernment quickly apologized and paid an indemnity of over
$�. QOO, OOQ, thousands of Japanese citizens sent contributions to the
American embassy to aid the su:rvivors and the families of the de
c.ea,ed.

3

Japanese occupation of Nanking caused'the United States

off�cials to issue a formal protest over damages to ,American property. 4
,After the Marc;:o Polo bridge in�dent, Japanese forces occupied
Peipi1'g and Tientisin, drove northwarq into Inner Mongolia and west
ward into Shansi province.
1DeConde, p. 570.
2
Ibid., p. 571.

3

Neumann, p. 234.

By December 1937, Nippon's army and

navy assaulted and captured Shanghai and proceeded up the Yangtze
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River to occupy Nanking. After fleeing to Hankow, the China govern-

ment established its headquarters at Chungking for the duration of the
war. As the war moved south in 1938, Japanese forces occupied

Canton, but thereafter its military machine be·came mired in China.
Throughout 1939 and 1940 the ''China Incident" was a stalemate and

Japanese military gains were negligible. 1

In November 1938, Prince Ko�?_YE:_E_:onounced his East Asia

-

-------·------�--

---·-----�-�---

-

Co-Properity Sphere, which was intended to
Japan the economic,
- - make
-.

---- -

military,
---------�

-

.

-

--

.-

--

and political leader of Asia.

.

Also it renounced the old

-

principles of the Open Door in China.2 That year, Japan went on"

war footing when the Diet passed the National General Mobilization �

Law, empowering the government to control human and material

resources.3

J

In conjunction with the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,

the Japanese helped establish the puppet government of Wang Ching

wei in Nanking.

Wang Ching-wei, formerly political heir to Sun

Yat-sen and a prominent member of the Kuomingtang, collaborated

with Japan in the overthrow of both the Chinese Communist and

Chiang Kai-Shek. 4

1 Togo, pp. 26-2 7.

2
3

DeConde, p. 573.

Togo, p. 37.

Ibid., p. 38.
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Indecision
over the
''China
Incident" and conflict of objectives
..
.. . . . .. .

�- .

between the civilian and military authorities led to constant changing
of cabinets in 1939-1940.

After Premier Konlye resigned in early

1939 there were three successive governments.
net fell after seven months.

The Hiranuma Cabi

The government ·of General Abe was

overthrown mainly because of this inability to reach an understanding
with China over the "China Incident." Admiral Yanai, a moderate,
lasted only six months because he opposed the Army's renewed ide
of an alliance with Germany.

� )

In July, 1940, Prince Konoye was agam

called upon to form a government. 1
, The Japanese invasion of China threatened China's political
future, American economic interests in China and the Open Door
policy.

Admiral Yarnell, a retired United States naval officer,

realized that the "New Order" meant the explusion of all western trade
and influence from the Far East except on Japan's terms.

He wrote:

"We are dependent almost entirely upon this area for a number of
raw materials vitally essential to us in peace and war. 11 2 An argument,
often stated, was that if Japan were to win China, the United States
would lose an important import-export market. 3 It was asserted that

1Ibid., p. 39.
2William Johstone, The United States and Japan's New Order
(London, New York, and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1941),
p. vii.
. son, p. 95.
3B1s
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the undeclared war

11

for the first time has threatened the complete

I

1
extinction of American rights and the American interest in China. 11

�merican policy makers in 1938 were faced with three prospects:
-.

.

I

I

complete withdrawal from the Far East; negotiation with Japan on
.

- -- �

----- - -� --

the changing status quo; or increased tensions· which would result

------------

from steps to meet the Japanese thrust.
war supplies going to Japan.

Steps were taken to restrict

�-

----

In
sum,xn.
--- er........oLL93-8.,�t.he
- the early
�
.

government imposed a "moral embargo" when airplane manufactures
were a�ke_? and��nsented to refrain from sendin� e uipment to Japan. 2
In 1939, economic pressure was opposed by Ambassador Grew because
he believed that economic sanctions carried to their logical conlusion

-----

would mean war, and because if the imposed sanctions were lifted
later it would mean a loss of American prestige.

The cutting of Japan 1s

oil supply, he feared, would lead to Japanese invasion of the Dutch
East Indies. 3

the President loaned $25,000,000 to help China resist Japanese mili
tary conquest.�

The United States also purchased silver from China
�

which gave Chiang Kai-Shek funds to buy more military supplies for

1Johnstone, p. 8.
2
DeConde, pp. 575-76.
3

Neumann, p. 244.

4DeConde, p. 573.
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his troops.

On July 26, 1939, Secretary of State Hull informed

Tokyo that the United States intended to abrogate the Commercial
Treaty of 1911. 1 After the treaty expired in January of 1940, trade
was on a day-to-day basis.

Hornbeck, now Political Advisor to the

Secretary of State on Far Eastern Affairs, advocated a strong policy
and was supported by Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau, along
with two new Roosevelt Cabinet appointees, Secretary of War Henry
L. Stimson and Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox.

Morgenthau and

Stimson advocated an embargo on oil, iron, and steel scrap shipments to Japan.

In May, 1940, the Pacific fleet's base was trans

ferred from San Diego to Pearl Harbor, as Hornbeck had urged.
Two months later, Congress passed a law placing strategic materials
under a licensing system and on July 26, the President signed an
order to include aviation gasoline, lubricating oils, high grade iron
and steel scrap. 2
In August, when the Japanese occupied Northern Indo-China,
the United States retailated by announcing, on September 25, a huge
loan to Chiang Kai-Shek and on the following day an embargo was
imposed on all iron and steel scrap going to Japan. 3 By the end of
1940, the main item of trade between Japan and the United States

1 Neumann, p. 253.
2Ibid., p. 263.
3

DeConde,pp. 587-90.

\
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was oil.

The Japanese threat in the Far East was not the only prob-

lem confronting the decision-makers in Washington.

Nazi Germany

also loomed as a terrible threat to Western democracy.

From the

moment of his a&2endency to the office of Chancellor of Germany,
Adolph Hitler sought to restore his nation to its status as a firstrate power in Europe.

The League of Nations, an instrument de-

vised to maintain the status quo of the Treaty Versailles, was
ineffective as a deterrent.

Germany proceeded to occupy the

Rhineland, Austria, and Czechoslovakia.

From 1933 to 1939 all

attempts to maintain the status quo through peaceful means were
in vain.

Once again, nationalism of Europe had come to the fore

and with the invasion of Poland, in September 1939, the world was
again at war.
President Franklin Roosevelt had to consider numerous factors
in formulating his foreign policy.

There was in being a strong isola-

tionist movement, and the Congress was passing restrictive neutrality
laws.

At the outset of war, the United States declared her neutrality.

On September 3, 1939, President Roosevelt stated:
. . . I have said not once but many times that I have seen
war and that I hate war.
I hope that the United States will keep out of this
war.

I believe that it will and I give you assurances that

every effort of your government will be directed to that
1
end. . .

1Roosevelt's Foreign Policy, 1933-1941:

Franklin D.

Roosevelt's

Speeches and Messages, compiled by Douglas Lurton (New York:
W. Funk Inc., 1942), p. 182.
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However, with the fall of Poland, the Low Countries and France,
the President expressed solemn concern as to the fate of the Allies.
The swift victories of Germany had not been expected and the origi
nal contention that the Allies were capable of resisting German
aggression had to be revised.
During 1940, Roosevelt commenced defense preparations and
began sending aid to Britain.

On May 16, 1940, he asked and J,"e

ceived from Congress $896,000,000 for the armed services:
$546, 000,000 for the army; $250,000,000 for the navy; and
$100,000,000 to the President for emergency measures. 1 With the
fall of France, the United States intensified its military preparations
and its obligations to the Allies.

On July 10, 1940, the American

President asked Congress for $4,848,171,957 for arms to equip two
million men. 2
By September 14, 1940, the Burk-Wadsworth compulsory
military act was passed, providing sixteen million men between the

ages of sixteen and thirty-five for the draft, effective October 16,
1940. 3 On December 29, 1940, the President maintained that the
United States must become the "arsenal of democracy 11 and supply
Great Britain with arms, ships, and airplanes. 4 By this
1Ibid. , p. 240.
2Ibid. , p. 254.
3
Ibid. , p. 273.
4Ibid.

, p. 310.
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declaration the United States permitted the sale of arms and food
stuffs to the British., while denying any such supplies to the Axis
powers.

The Americans were involved, in 1940-1941, in an und�-

clared war with Germany, in which there were, in the Atlantic,
many exchanges of shellfire.

----------

While the situation was serious in Europe, American policy
in the Pacific theater became more stringent and,_inflexible.
end of 1940

By the

the cabinet in Washinton felt that Great Britain and her

allies could not defe,�.t the Axis powers themselves. 1 Germany,

concerned with the war in Western Europe, expressep. a desire to
maintain friendship with the United States.

It was her fervent de-

sire to avoid a mistake similar to that made in World War I. So
long as Roosevelt pledged that "we will not send our men to take

part in a European war, 11 2 and so long as Congress did not declare
war, it became advantageous for Germany to shy away from declaring wa;r on the United States.
Both Germany and Japan had talked about an alliance prior to

------

-----

_19.40. After Prince Konoye became Premier for the second time,

··--------

,.,.-

r

negotiation� _f.9.E an agreement began in August of 1940. Foreign Mins
-i.-t�r �::suoka fav=��-=�peration for the purpose� �f neutralizing
1Rear Admiral Robert Theobald, "The Big Secret of Pearl Har
bor," U.S. News and World Report,XXXVII (April 2, 1954),.p. 48.

2Roosevelt' s Foreign Policy, 1933-1941, p. 259.
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America.

Also Japan attempted to restrain the United States from

entering the war.

In the negotiations between Germany and Japan the

central theme was:
A strong and determined attitude, unequivocal and unmis
takeable, on the part of the three nations, Japan, Germany,
and Italy and the knowledge of it by the United States and the
world at large at this juncture, that alone can only be of a
powerful and effective deterrent on the United States ... 1
Prince Konoye, the Japanese Prime Minister, opposed the pro-posed alliance, but he was unable to impose his views on Foreign
Minister Matsuoka, and Minister of War Tojo. The matter was presented to the Emperor, who consented to a defensive alliance because
the danger of war with the United States was real. 2 On September 27,
1941, the Three Power Pact, otherwise called the. ,Tripartite Pact,
.

was signed in Berlin by Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop, Ambassador Kurusu, and Count Ciano� the respective representatives of the
governments of Germany, Japan, and Italy. 3 The main clause of the
Pact was Article III by which the three signees agreed to provide

J

political, economic, and military assistance to one another if any of
�
the three powers were attacked by a power not at that time involved

_____________________________________ )
/

1German Foreign Policy, Series D (Washington: U. S. Govern
ment Printing Office, 1954), VIII, 57-58.
2

u.

S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign
Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941 (Washington: U. S.
Government Printing Office, 1953), II, 663, [ Hereafter cited as
F. R. U. S., Japan, II].
3Germany Foreign Policy, p. 204.

in the European war or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict. 1

;1
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Ambassador Grew, in writing to Washington the next day, mentioned that a senior member of the Italian Embassy stated the word
"attack" in Article III could mean various kinds of attack, including
economic sanctions, and that the alliance was intended as a

II

stop

light" for the United States.2 Germany and Italy threatened the
United States with the prospects of a two front war, hoping that this

fact would force the United States into easing its tensions with the

Axis powers. However, this did not occur, for Roosevelt was committed to both England and China. If anything the Tripartite Pact

"was one of the major factors in stimulating the trend of American
opinion away from isolationism.

11

3 In fact, the pact really meant

that "war i_:1__ -A_sia and war in Europe are 0ne and the same war. 114
It appears that since Germany would avoid war in the Atlantic

Ocean, how could the United States get Japan to invoke the Tripartite
libid., p. 204-05.
2Joseph C. Grew, Ten Years in Japan (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1944), p. 651.
3

u.

S. Oepartment of State, Foreign Relations of the United
States, The Far East, 1941 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing
Office, 1956), IV, 234-35. [Hereafter cited as F. R. U. S., The
Far East, IV] .
4Johnstone, p. Viii.
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Pact and to make the initial overt act of war? 1 The embargoes in

1940-1941, the unwillingness to negotiate about the "China Incident,"

- ------------··------------------

and the refusal to trade with Prince Konoye I s government had taken

their toll. As far as the United States was concerned,
--·
-- ---·.

it was merely

a matter of when the war would officially begin.
Japan's miscalculated aim in signing the Tripartite Pact was to
prevent the United States from going to war.

It appeared to coincide

with the army's policy of close ties with Germany.

Prince Konoye,

who had not yet begun his peace offensive, did not have the complete
support of the military leaders who were unwilling to retreat from

China even though the Japanese had not made any gains since 1938.
Japanese expansion affected the status quo in the Far East.

As the

United States and Japan disagreed on principles and aims of their
---

�

------

polic�-�
-----

~

and as the respective countries were bonded to acts and

of the previous decade, the vicious circle of events
pri�ciples
_
became entangled. It became very difficult to agree on an honorable
solution which would satisfy the United States and Japan.

1 Charles Callan Tansil!, Back Road to War: Roosevelt I s Foreign
Policy, 1933-1941 (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1952), pp. 625'-26.

CHAPTER III

AT'l'EMPTS FOR PEACE FROM JANUARY TO JULY

F.E_?!.Il J_anuary,

1941,

to December 7,

1941,

1941

Japan intensified

her efforts to reach a n�gotiated settlement with the United States.

In summing up his impression of the diplomatic intercourse,
Joseph C. Grew, the United States Ambassador to Japan expressed
the view that:
. . . !+ttle or no eviden� is apparent in the official corres
pondence of a desire or of efforts on the part of our govern
ment to simplify Prince Konoye's difficult task or to meet
him even part way. So far as we in the Embassy could
perceive, the policy of the administration during this criti
cal time was almost completely inflexible . . . 1
This statement by an American ambassador confirmed the central
theme of American foreign policy which frustrated Japanese repre
sentatives in Washington.

<.. -

At the beginning of
---

1941,

Premier Konoye appointed retired

_ _!\dmiral Kichisaburo Nomura as Japan's Ambassador to the United
States.

He was chosen because he had known President Roosevelt

--- �-

-�---- ---

-------

_w_�e� the _latter -�as the Assj.stant Secretary of the Navy. 2 Prior to

1
Joseph C. Grew, The Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of
Forty Years, (1905-1945), ed. Walter Johnson (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1952), II, 1935.
2

Robert Butow, "Hull-Nomura Conversations: A Fundamental
Misconception," American Historical Review, LXV, (July, 1960), 822.
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arriving in Washington, Nomura was given advice by Foreign Minis�
ter Matsuoka who held a strong pro-Axis, non-conciliatory position

towards negotiations with the United States.

Since Nomura desired

peace, he disregarded Matsuoka' s advice and proceeded from the
beginning of his tenure as Ambassador to Washington to work closely
with Premier Konoye.
After being replaced as Ambassador to Germany by General
Oshima, Saburo Kurusu returned to Japan via the United States to

unofficially talk with officials in Washington.

America's Charge'

d 'Affaire in Berlin, Leland Morris, felt that Kurusu' s belief was
that war with the United States would be a disaster.

Since Kurusu

was married to an American woman, he was favorably disposed to�
peace between the two countries. 1
From Shanghai, on February 14, 1941, Consul General Lockhart sent a message to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, concerning
a m,ilitary conference held in Nanking involving high Japanese military officials.

The eighteen commanding officers expressed the

desire to end the China War and were prepared to recognize Chiang

Kai-Shek.

The Japanese might be willing to guarantee China's

national independence, which would mean the withdrawal of all
Japanese troops south of the Great Wall.

t<;> be considered.

American mediation was

The opinion expressed at the Nanking Conference

was thought to be the attitude of the Tokoyo government.
lF. R. U. S. The Far East, IV, 30.

The basic

�
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aim, as stated °By Japanese army officials, was that both sides should
·-· ·- .! ------ - -· - -·- �-

------------ ---------

·-------- - - - --·· . ---·

- - •--.

-� -

come out of the conflict witho.JJ.Llo.s..s_Qf_face.
--=--

The desire for peace

expressed here also came from Tokyo, where the Japanese govern
ment wanted all the possibilities discreetly explored. 1

The telegram

of February 14, 1941, permitted the American government to know
unofficially that the Japanese desired peace.

An American mediation

clause was included to allow the United States to take the initial steps
to peace.
On February 15, 1941, while Chiang Kai-Shek met with Japanese
officials, the United States Ambassador to China, Nelson Johnson,
wrote that if the United States consented to withdrawal of the Japanese
troops from China, Japan would consolidate her position in the South
Seas.

2
In reply to a query from Ambassador Leahy in Vichy, France

on February 2, 1941, Cordell Hull stated that there was no significant change in the talks between either Japan and the United States
or Japan and China.

Nanking

The sending of Foreign Minister Matsuoka to

constituted a high level of representation in the Japanese

hierarchy.

By dismissing the possibility for the meeting's success,

Hull indicated a clear skepticism of the chance for an agreement at
the conference. 3

1
Ibid.
2
3

Ibid. ,

p. 36.

P· 41.

Ibid. , p.

47.
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The initiative for Japanese-American negotiations in the spring
of 1941 came from the private efforts of the Japanese special envoys
and two Maryknoll Catholic priests, Bishop James E. Walsh and
Father James M. Drought who worked with fellow Roman Catholic,
United States Postmaster-General Frank C. Walker.
knoll fathers labored on a preliminary

11

The Mary

Draft Understanding 11 with

Japanese representatives. 1 The two Japanese visitors to the Unit,eq
States were Tadao Wikawa and Colonel Hideo lwakuro.

Mr. Wil<awa,

an ardent Christian whose daughter was studying at Columbia University, was a prominent man in Japanese financial circles.

He

was preparing negotiations for Colonel Iwakuro, who was desc11ibed
as one of

11

the driving forces of the army.

nated to aid Ambassador Nomura.

11

Both me:q. were desig

Both men had the blessing of th

Japanese government. 2 The Colonel Iwakuro appointment meant
that the army was prepared to negotiate seriously with the United
States.

Ambassador Grew significantly remarked that the Colonel

was one of the most important leaders of the young officers 1 group
and had the confidence of the Minister of War. 3 Hidek.j. Tojo chose
the Colonel because he was experienced in dealing with the

11

China

1Butow, American Historical Review, LXV, (July, 1960),
2 F. R. U. S. The Far East, IV, 51-52.
' 3rbid. , p. 53.

823-24.
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1
ljowever, by Febr\,lary 28,
Incident. 11

1 941,

Plenipotentiary repre-

sentative of Japan Mr. Tadao Wikawa was prepared to take the

following steps:
l.
2.
3.
41
5.

To invite President Roosevelt to mediate the Japanese
Chinese conflict.
To nullify Japanese participation in the Axis alliance
by refusal to send Germany supplies and to keep Ger
many out of the Far East.
To freeze ttie Pacific nations into the status quo.
To pledge their government against any political or
military aggression in the Far East.
To promote amicable relations by economic and
financial agreement.

Japan suggl:!sted that the United States appoint a representative to
work out privc;1.tely a draft agreanent, and upon official approval of
the ter,ms by Japan, the President could call a conference to broad
cast the agreement which would have previously been consummated.2

In a memorandum, dated March 7,

1 94 1 ,

Advisor on Political

Relat�OllS Roger Hornbeck stated:
. . . Our �mmediate problem, it seems to us, is that of
1) keeping the Japanese in a state of hoping and yet having
to gl.Jess c;1.nd 2) finding ou,t all we possibly can regarding
their thoughts and their actual or possible intentions. . . 3
This stat�ro.ent allowed the United States to inquire into the Japanese
pQsitlon without permitting that leeway which would make a successful

1Butow, ,American Historical Review, LXV, (July, 1960), 824.
z F. R. U. S., The Far East , IV, 54.
3ibid ., p. 62.
---.--
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negotiation possible.

The attitude of the Department of State seemed

to be inflexible while the Japanese searched for amicable solutions
to the problems confronting the two countries.
On March 11, 1941, after learning of the Japanese attempts
for peace via a Plenipotentiary representative, Hull, in a conversa.,.

:

\

tion with Nomura, denounced Japanese methods of government, and
inquired whether the Japanese Ambassador to Wash:i,ngton thought
Japan would attack Signapore.

I

Nomura repli�d th_at if the embargoes____

-

persisted
in Japan wo
_ }lld get complete c;:ontrol
) th-_e milH?,ry
-------group
. ···•- · . -·
�

--

of the government.
-

The embargo was hurting Japan considerably
------ ----�--------..
and in order �-conclude an a reement_ in the _South S�asL the :rade

-- -------

--------

---

embargo must be lifted. At the conclusion of the visit, Hull stated
that the United States wanted Japan to cease all action on the ma.inland before discussions took place.

He desired these terms without

defining the position of his country. 1
Five days later the American preliminary draft of an "Agree ...
ment in Principle 112 which was drawn up by Postmaster-General
Walker and the State Department was approved by the Japanei,e
Plenipotentiary representative Wikawa.
1.
2.

2

These principles were:

Total dissolution of the German-Japanese partnership,
and the complete cessation of trade,
Release of considerable Japanese tonnage to be char
tered by the United States.

1
Ibid. , p. 68.
Ibid., p. 95.

/
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3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Uniteq States and Japanese naval agreement for
mutual aid.
Secret terms of settlement of the Chinese War confided
to the United States government.
Creation of autonomous states to prevent seizure of
war spoils.
Guarantee of the Philippines independence and conditional
aid in war.
Japanese pledge against political and ·military seizure
of territory.
Vast economic provisions for mutual benefit.

Proposed secret terms for a settlement of the China-Japan conflict
involved China's independence, withdrawal of Japanese troops, and
no imposition of indemnities.

Provisions were made for: gold

credit; future distribution of new oil resources; equitable ownership
of new undeveloped fields; and Japanese-American ownership of
raw material companies in the South Pacific.1
On the next day, the seventeenth of March, Walker mentioned
that top members of the Japanese cabinet were endangering their
lives by allowing the negotiations to take place. The Plenipotentiary
agent would not confide his aim to the Japanese embassy unless a
substantial agreement was reached. 2
On March 11, 1941, the President of the United States signed
the Lend-Lease bill of January 11.

This Lend-Lease program appro

priated $7,000,000,000 for aid to Great Britain. 3 While the United
1Ibid., pp. 97-107.
2Ibid. , p. 111.
JRoosevelt's Foreign Policy, 1933-1941, p. 339.
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States government attempted to insure Japanese denial of aid to Ger_,..
many, it proceeded on March 27, to lease from Great Britain for

I

ninety-nine years, naval sites at Newfoundland, Bermuda, The
Bahamas, Jamaica, Trinidad, Antigua, and British Guiana.1 As a

l
\

",,

result of Lend-Lease, the occupation of Greenland, and the submarine

/
,/

trouble in the Atlantic, Matsuoka told Ambassador Grew in Tokyo
that the American foreign policy was designed to make war with Ger
many inevitable,

If the United States was the aggressor, Japan

---

would honor_Article HI of the Tripartite Pact. 2
·-. -- ------ ------·� -------·---- -- - ---- When Colonel Iwakuro came to New York at the end of March
he have his "unofficial" consent to the "Agreement in Principle. 11
However, he did insist on economic and political concessions before
3
it would be politically possible "to effect a 180 degree change 11 in �

'

Japan. Postmaster-General Walker also noted that "if these nego
tiations with the United States fail, the Japanese a,.uthorities are certain
that they will lose control and a war in the Southwestern Pacific will
be started. 114
While the Plenipotentiary representative was trying to work
out an agreement, Ambassador Nomura began conversations on a
regular basis with Secretary of State Hull.
1Ibid., p. 351.
2 F. R. U. S., The Far East, IV, 194.
3
Ibid., p. 119.
4Ibid.,
p. 120.

/

) ·-

J
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The United States also was searching for guarantees. On
April 7, 1941, Hornbeck's appraisal of Japan's proposal was negative,
as he wanted Japan to cease all manoeuvers in China as a conrete
example of her intentions. The Japanese suggestion that the United
States minimize European influence in Southeast Asia was answered
by the question:

"Why should we help .Japan against Great Britian?

11

Hornbeck also inferred in this proposal that to give some economic
consideration to the Ja· anese was disadvantageous to America.
Finally he concluded with th� idea thp.t it would serve the United ,
States I purpose if China was in a war with Japan in the event that the (
United States entered the war against the Japanese. Hence, the high
cost of Japanese soldiers, ammunition supplies, and energies in the
Chinese theater would leave the United States less to contend with
militarily.1
Through the months of April, May, and June, Colonel Iwakuro
and
. Wit�:w1Lan.cLAm.e.rl.c.an_:r..e:p.i:.e..s..enta.tiY-.-e _s_ wor 15,ed__on
the re -·--- Mr
- ��-------drafts, oral explanati,Qns.., -and
----·------�--ment in Principles,
States and Japan.
-------

11

whic

would be satisfactor

reeto both the United

However Hornbeck's attitude seems to be indicative

of the predominant trend in the State Department, i. e. , being doubtfu�
of Japanese intentions.
1
Ibid., pp. 123-25.

__j
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... I do not believe those leaders Japanese political
and military leaders , and I therefore do not believe
that Ja.pan will in the near future abandon in any sense
whatever their doctrine of military conquest by force .

1

United States rejection of the Japanese Plenipotentiary 1 s proposal
was based on a series of arguments set forth by Hornbeck on

May 23, 1941:
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Japan is bent on imperial expansion.
Japan hopes for control in China.
Japan wants power, prestige, and privileges in the
Far East.
Japan wants to delay our decisions.
Japan wants to prevent United States support of
Great Britain.
Japan wants to shake Ctlina I s confidence in the
United States.
Japan wants to shake Great Britain's confidence
in the United States. 2

While

doubts were being expressed in Washington, Ambassador

Grew wrote to Washin ton on May

26

and May

2 7,

stating that

------

the

--if

_United_§__!�t_es c;:ould reach an agreement with Japan, changes in

Japanese policy could be effected. Grew reported that neither the
extremists nor the moderates had made important gains although he
believed the momentary trend favored the moderates. 3

In another

dispatch the American Ambassador wrote that the attempted bilateral
commitment had the approval of the Emperor, the cabinet, and probably
l�

., p.

162.

p.

223.

2
Ibid.

3Ibid.

, p.

231.
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the Privy Council.

While the only opposition could come from the

army and navy, "We have good reason to believe that both the War and
Navy Ministers, in general terms, favor a settlement along the gen
1
eral lines under discussion. 11

According to Grew the United States

has very much to gain.
From the point of view of constructive statem,;1.nship, I be
lieve that our Government should proceed with the negotia
tions with a view to entering the proposed commitments.
The alternative might well be progressive deterioration of
American-Japanese relations eventually leading to war ..
If a settlement on paper can be achieved, I have substantial
hope that it will not fail in implementation. 2

-

The Chinese position at this time was stated by the Reverend

- ----- ----.

-

.

- - ·--- .. -- --- -- - -·-- - -------

W. P. Mills of Nanking who said, in the li ht of Japanese
concessions,
-- ·---------·-- -··

------·---·---- ---·

--�---------------·,

-- ------·---------

the Chinese had become firm and now wanted Japan to evacuate Man-

- - ------

.

�h;;ia.3 Therefore no headway in talks, either in the United State�
or in China was being made by Japan.

Also China's Ambassador
I

to the United States, Hu Shih, wrote to the Secretary of State that he
doubted whether Japan could be weaned away from the Axis powers.
I am therefore compelled to conclude that . . . the best
solµtion seems to lie in assisting China to continue to a
succes13ful ending to her war of resistance of Japanese
aggression, and in maintaining a firm diplomatic apd
naval position in the Pacific. 4
1Ibid.

2
Ibid. , p. 232.
3
Ibid. , p. 234.
4Ibid., pp . 225-226.
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Another serious blow to Japan's economic and military potential ca:���= t�entieth of June, when the ;:te�-;����-;�t;

e�
�c t

the export of petroleum products to all nations except Oreat Britain. 1

--------

As the negotiations became more intense, the relations between
Japan and the United States worsened. Two days after the American

- -----

arn;w occupied Icelaµd, Uncler-.Secretary of State Sumner Welles
received a commu1;1ique from the Office of Naval Operations, men
tioning that the Japanese were going to march into southern Indo
2
China.
On the same day, Grew mentioned that he was not getting all
the confidential inform,atlon available, which made it impos ::iible for
him to be up to date with Washington's position. He mentioned
". , . A motor catl,not function effectively unl.ess it is hitting all
cylinders . . . 113
Japan made two changes in the American draft on "Agreement
in Principle."

The first proposed that the withdrawal frqm China

take place two years, at a maxir.p.um, upon restoration of peace and
the second that, rather than negotiate on the Manchukuo question,
Japan wanted recognition of M.anchukuo.4
1Roosevelt' s Jfor �nn Policy, p. 424.
�
2

F. R. U, S., Thef'arEast , IV. 298.

3
4

�., p. 300.

�., -.P· 313.

�
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- --

Understanding" was sent to Tokyo, Japanese

Draft
-----------------

When the

11

-·

----

------

civilian and military leaders felt that the relations with the United

··---��--·--

States were on the verge of improving.
that the

11

The Japanese government felt

Draft Understanding" was an official revision of an earlier

American

11

Agreement in Principle.

11

Since Washington did not re-

gard Iwakuro and Wiwaka as official representatives with the full
blessings of the Japanese cabinet, the State Department interpreted
Tokyo's positive reply as Japan 1 s first "official proposition" to the
proposed understanding.

Japan erroneously judged and measured

various subsequent American proposals using the "Draft Understanding 11 as a guideline.

Therefore the hardening of the American

_ r� '.__1
posit�on �.a:3. disappointii:�g to_J..apan.e�_e._l�_�de
On July 17, 1941.t..-1.h� second Kono..y..e-.g-0..Y..er
. ..nment resign�_d.
There was a grave difference of opinion bet�n_E_o_reign Minister
•

-----

•-----

-

-�•

- •-- -

Matsuoka and Premier K
_ ono e.

Tripartit�J>act m

-•-

•

w• •-•--

---

•

•

•

-

• •-••--

-

Matsuoka
felt that Article III of the
- - - --·--------------

nt that Ja an had to side with Germany if war

should occur between the 11.!!it.-ed States and Germany, whereas the

-----�

---- -----

Prime Minister did not share this view.

The resignation of the �

whole cabinet was used to eliminate dissident members. 2 On the

'·"

-........

(
\

following day the third Konoye government was formed with Admi�
Toyoda being appointed as Foreign Minister. Grew reported that
1Butow, American Historical Review, LXV, (July, 1960), 834.
2

F. R. U. S., The Far East , IV, 327.
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Admiral Toyoda was considered friendly towards the United States
and was not known to have any pro-Axis sentiments. 1 On July 19,
Grew felt that the new Konoye government meant the removal of

"Nazi-Fascist tinge" in the cabinet, no reversal in policy except to

take less advice from Germany and to avoid a clash with the United

States, and a fusion of military, economic, and political leaders.2

\

ln mid-July, Japan demanded that the Vichy government of

- - - ----·- -·-----·- ---

-•---

--

·-

---·--

France agree to Japanese occupation of southern Indo-China.

--- -

-

- - --- -

July 24, 1941, the Japanese, upon reaching an agreement with

J

On

Vichy France, moved into southern Indo-China and occupied, not

only the air bases, but also the army bases. A last minute Ameri-

'1

can effort for a multilateral agreement failed as the proposal did not

\'

reach Japanese officials in Tokyo until after southern Indo-China

was occupied. 3 T e Japanese occupation of southern Indo-China

was instigated partially as a reaction to the United States moving into

Greenland and_ Iceland and partially as a reaction to the embargo the.*

United States imposed on raw materials, specifically the latest one

on petroleum, which was issued on June 20, 1941. Also the Japanese

.,,.-- --·-

--�- ----·--·

were disillusioned about the failure to reach a ne otiated settlement

...._. ---·----

----

-- ----------

--- ---

- -- ~-----------

with the United States. The State Department was aware of the move

1Ibid.,

2
3

p. 328.

Ibid., p. 332.

Robert C. Butow, Tojo and the Coming of the War, (Princ.eton:

University of Princeton Press, 1961), p. 222.
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in early July, 1941. There were different opinions on what the nature

of the American response to Japan would be.

While the desperate

economi<: _sit_ _uat�_ �!.1 .. �!:l I.�Pa!:l P.!Orripted the move into southern IndoChina, the United States interpreted it as an act of bad faith while
the conversations in Washington were continuing.

----

Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs Maxwell Hamilton
opposed

11•

•

•

instituting a program of drastic economic and other

restrictive measures against Japan. 111
R. Kelly Turner, the Director of the War Plans Division of
the Navy Department, wrote to Chief of Naval Operations Admiral
Stark, setting forth reasons for rejecting a total embargo.

--··-·--�-

-·-·---------

--··•-·-- - ·--- -�

Turner

stated that licensed control had created sharp.decline of American

------·------------- --- --

-·--· -----------,.

export in machine tools, ferro-alloys and refined copper, while
scr�
t_ d__S!i:!e� � de
e
_ P iron export was___ �-�ac�-i�-�lly_�egligib�
_ ._JJ�l E:
_ _
- _ _:---J/

------- --·· -

ln May.

...

"It is generally believed that the shutting off of American""

supply of petroleum will lead promptly to an invasion of the Netherlands East Indies.

11 2

Admiral Stark informed President Roosevelt that he opposed
the embargo because:

though not immediately, an embargo would

hampe� Japan 1 s long-term effort; and an embargo would result in
1F. R. U. S., The Far East , IV, 326.
2

,1-.....__,_

-------- ·-----

with Japan in 1941 fell from $11,336,000
in January to $6,594,000
-�

Ibid., pp. 837-39.

(
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an early Japanese attack against the British and Dutch possessions
in the Far East as well as the Philippines. 1
On July 25,

1941, President Roosevelt imposed a total embarg; /

2 Stanley K.
on Japa�_ and froze JapanE:se �-�s
-�n th= �nited States.
- �ts
Hornbeck favored these moves and warned against the measure be
coming just a mere gesture of retaliation.3 Realizing that the
freezing of assets and the embargoes might lead to an attack on the
Philippines, President Roosevelt dispatched General Douglas Mac Arthur to set up United States military headquarters in Manila and
to organize its defenses. 4

Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson

interpreted the American measures as the

11road

to war.

115

American policy was committed to a course of action which
was by its very nature suspicious of Japanese intentions. Secretary
of State Cordell Hull felt that:
We were convinced that an Allied victory was passible
and we were determined to do everything we could to bring it
about, short of actually sending an expeditionary force to

1

u.

S. Congress, Pearl Harbor Attack: Hearing before the Joint
Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 29th Con.,
V , (Washington: U. S. Printing Office, 1946), · 2379-84, Hereafter
cited as Pearl Harbor Attack , cited by Charles A. Beard, President
Roosevelt and the Coming of the War: A Study in Appearance and
Realities, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), p. 179.
2
3

Roosevelt' s Foreign Policy, p. 450.
F. R. U. S., The Far East, IV, 347.

4George Morgenstern, Pearl Harbor: The Story of the Secret
War, (New York: The Devin-Adair Co., 1947), p. 425.
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Europe or the Orient. 1
... our position as a Government had been made clear.
We regarded Japan as an ally of Hitler and Mussolini, a
signatory to an alliance aimed at us. We considered
Japan's expansionist ambitions an eventual danger to our
own safety. 2
In late July the United States broke off conve:sa�io��_c_>_D:_!__
�e "Draft
_
-· --------- ·-------------

-

Understanding" with Colonel lwakuro and Mr.--Wikawa.
- -- · . ------�-----·

------------,----

Events led

to a strong stand by the United States while Japan took the initiative
of trying to find ways and means to bring about a negotiated settlement.

Ho�e:" �� when Premi:_� �o�oye and _the army and navy
_ _ _

simulta
_ ��?_'-:�ly _�ecided to move south in Indo-China and to preserve
nego!i�t_i9:r1�_,.__they •�c;_:ut_�he ground fJ"Qll'l unde.r. diplomacy, and
rendered an eventual war between Japan and the United States
inevitable. 113
The intransigent United States attitude in the first six montlts''
of the 1941 negotiations is thus clear from the record. Japan represented a threat to the American position in the Far East. The
United States was convinced of the need for an Allied victory in Europe and the Orient. Officials in Washington, aware of the Japanese

army's power, were not sure if a negotiated settlement with the
1Cordell Hull, Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: MacMillan
Co., 1948), II, 919.

2
Ibid. , p. 982.
3Togo, p. 81.
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civilian cabinet would be honored by the Japanese military leaders.
Furthermore, Japan had violated previous treaties and the United
States feared she would break any new agreement. When Japan was
condemned as an aggressor in Manchuria, she walked out of the
League of Nations and by invading China she did not honor her com
mitment to the Kellogg-Briand Pact.

Japan had an existing agree

ment with Germany i.e., the Tripartite Pact, and since Tokyo was
willing to disregard this pact, policymakers in Washington were
not assured that Japan would subsequently honor a pact with the
United States.

Also Washington was not sure whether Japan wanted

to withdraw from the costly war in China because she wanted peace
or because she wanted to utilize their military power against the
rich British, Dutch, and French possessions in the Far East.

Finally

the Japanese occupation of southern Indo-China during negotiations
with the United States led Washington to doubt Japan's desire for
peace.

CHAPTER IV
JAPAN'S PLANS FOR WAR A;ND
T!1E FA,l.,L OF THE ;KONOYE GOVE;IlNM;ENT
Like all nations which are involved in p�ace conversatfons,
Japan
plans for war as an alternative
if negotiations failed.
-· - - - �-prepared
·
·- -- ···- --·-- -· · ·------------··· - ·- --

.

In ea!}_y_l_9-!_L_ th�-J�panese navy defined foµr instance13 in which

__,....-------

Japan might have to go to war.

These were: an all out embargo;

Anglo-American strategic cooperation against Japal); Anglo
American military build-up in the Far East; and the possible separ
atfon of �ngland and America as allies. 1 In J�nuary of- 1941 Admiral
-

-

Isorolcu Yamamoto conceived a bold plan for a lightning strike
···-

·· ·--------

agq.�nst American military forces and installations at Pearl Harbor. 2

------�---------- ------.

-----------

Duriri.g the summer of 1941 army and navy staff ofncers fre-

quelltly disc;u1:1sed with government officials the possible ramifications
of a war against the United St�tes and Epgland.

Admiral Isoroku

Yamamoto, Commander-in-,Chief of the Comb:j.ned Fleet, ftilly realized
the diffic�ltles Japan would face in an extended 13truggle, including in
surmountable problems of maintaining and increasing qual.i.fied flight
c:i,ew13 and Sl,lpplying minimum numbers of combat planes to the front,
1Bl.ltQw, Tojo and the Coming of the War, p. 203.
I

2Neumann, p. 278.
53

54
Admiral Yamamoto frankly informed Premier Konoye:
If you tell me that it is necessary that we fight,
then in the first slx months to a year of war against the
United States and England I will run wild, and I must
also tell you that should the war be prolonged for two or
three years, I have no confidence in our ultimate
victory. 1
After the United States froze Japanese assets, England and Dutch
East Indies followed suit, and Japan faced the prospect of a total
economic blockade.

Tokyo regarded the new Amei:_:ican me�sure

as the final major link in the encirclement of Japan.
� -··

-�·

--------- ----------

·-- .

War Minister

Hidek_i Tojo felt that �e_cause Japan depended on the Asian continent
for foodstuffs and raw materials, trade was a matter of life and
dea_th for his_ country. __ He stated that

11

Japan was being coerced by

a circle of force directed against her by American, Britain, China,
and the Dutch. 11 2
On July 31, Chief of the Naval General Staff Admiral Nagano
conveyed his impressions of relations with the United States to the
Emperor.

While the navy wj_s.h.e.d-t.o_@,m.icL

r with the United States,

no adjustment could be made so long as Japan adhered to the Tri
partite Pact.

-----------

Since Japan had only a two-year supply of oil, if
.

1

M. Okumiya, and Jiro Horikoshi, Zero, the Inside Story of
Japan's War in the Pacific, translated by Martin Caiden, (New York:
Ballantine Books, 1956), p. 39.
2auoted in Butow, Tojo and the Coming of the War, p. 224.

55
negotiations were not suc���sful,
Japan would have no choic_e but to
··--· · - ----go to war in order to maintain itself. 1

--

-

- - ----·----

- ----.

The army and navy did not agree on what policy Japan should
follow.

'

"'

After being pressured by the army's general staff, the

Japanese navy agreed that war preparations should begin while diplomatic negotiations continued, and that if diplomacy failed to bring

-

about a settlement by the middle of October, the use of force would
- --

·----------

be unavoidable. 2
On September 3, 1941, the top cabinet ministers and the leader
of the Supreme Command decided:
If, by the early part of October, there is no prospect of
being able to attain our demands, we shall immediately
decide to open hostilities against the United States, Great
:Sritain, and the Netherlands.
The next day the third Konoye cabinet gav_e its approval_ to this decision.
------ - --- ---·

--

The army was determined that if current negotiations failed, war would
immediately begin. 3 By September 6 an Imperial Conference approved
war preparation if diplomatic negotiations failed.

Approval for the

Pearl Harbor attack plan was to be given in mid-October.

Twenty-

nine separate targets from Hawaii to the Philippines, Malaya, and
:Hong Kong were chosen for simultaneous attack. 4
1
Ibid, , p. 234.
2
3

�.' p. 246.
Ibid. , p. 250.

4
Neumann, p. 279.

../
\
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In August American policy stiffened and the Atlantic Conference
illustrated the fact that the United States was not ready to compromise
with Japan in the Far East.

The Atlantic Conference, held off the

coast of Argentia Bay, Newfoundland, from August 9th to 12th ended
with a pledge of non- belligerence and continued· United States I aid
to the British effort against Nazi tyranny. 1 However, the trip
throu,gh a German-mined sea was not solely for the purpose of draw
ing up a series of principles against the Third Reich, but also to
draw up a common policy of resistance to further Japanese aggres
sion,

2

Recalling the significance of the meeting with reference to

the Far East, Winston Churchill stated in a speech to Parliament,
on January 27, 1942,
The probability, since the Atlantic Conference . . . that
the United States even if not herself attacked would come
into a war in the Far East and thus make final victory
assured, seemed to allay some of these anxieties . . . 3
During the Atlantic Conference, Churchill asked for a joint
ultimatum against Japan, but Roosevelt was against this proposal for
fear that Congress might not approve it.

He did agree though,

1charles Callan Tansill, Japanese-American Relations, Harry
Elmer Barnes ed., Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace (Coldwell,
Idaho: The Caxton Printers Ltd., 1953), p. 332.
2Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate His
tory (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), p. 350.
3Winston Churchill, The End of the Beginning (Boston: Little
and Brown and Co., 1943), p.. 33,
. \
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. . . to do some plain talking to Japan--not an ultimatum
but something that very closely approximates that and
can easily lead to it later if the Japanese do not accept
our demands. 1
When President Roosevelt returned from the Atlantic Conference
he handed a written statement to Japanese Ambassador Nomura, in
which the United States berated the Japanese move into Indo-China
and warned Japan
. . . Such being the case, this government now finds it
ne�essary to say to the government of Japan, that if the
Japanese government takes any steps in pursuance of a
policy or program of military domination by force or
threat of force of neighboring countries, the government
of the United States will be compelled to take immediately,
any and all steps which it may deem necessary towards
�afeguarding the le�itimp.te rights of American nationals,
and towards insuring the safety and security of the United
States. 2
This statement seemed to indicate that the next military move on the
part of the Imperial Japanese government might bring the United States
into the war.

Great Britain, the Netherlands, and China also sent

identical notes to Japan.
Qn the following day, Prince Konoye made a proposal to meet
Roosevelt at Honolulu to resolve their problems. Ambassador Grew,
on August 19, referrec;l to Konoye 1 s attempt for peace by stating
11•

•

•

It reveals a supreme effort on the part of the government to

maiptain peace with the United States . . . 11 The Ambassador's
lauoted ip. Neumann, p. 272.
2 F. R. U. S., The Far East , IV, 395.
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explanation for this proposal was that Japan was economically starving
--··

as a result of United States embargoes and that extremists were

-- �------------- --

-- __

·-

trying to get control of the government.

-

_
_;.

-·

___,____

______

.___

---

Grew also mentioned that

if this meeting was rejected there would be a shift in policy and that
the Konoye cabinet would be replaced.

Thus the fate of the country

would be in the hands of the military. 1 In a note to the Secretary of
St4te, three days later, G:rew voiced his distress over the consid
erable amount of press comment of the alleged encirclement of
Japan by the United States and Great Britain. 2
In Washington, Admiral Nomura still worked for a peaceful
conclusion to the China question.

It was the idea of the Japanese

that the United States try to bring Japan and China together to
negoti�te the end of the war. 3 However, ten days before, on August
18, 1941, Sec11etary of State Hull stated the position that the President had taken.

President Roosevelt said that when Japan ceased

her expansion�st activity and furnished a clear indication that she
would embark on a peaceful program, the United States would con

sider resumption of the informal exploratory discussions. 4 China's
Foreign Minister Quo stated that Chiang Kai-Shek did not favor a
1Ibid.
2

P· 398.

Ibi�. , p.

409.

R.

u. s.'

Ja:ean,

4F. R.

u. s.'

The Far East, IV,

:3F.

II. 576-79.
379.
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peaceful solution of the China war with Japan unless it was a part
of a general world settlement.

The policy now definitely left the

Japanese war machine in China without hope of peace. Pressure
was brought to bear on the United States and Great Britain by China,

whose d�sire was to get the two Anglo-Saxon nations into a Pacific
war.

1
In Tokyo, Ambassador Grew constantly was warning the State

Pepartmen t of the explosive situation in Tokyo.

On the topic of the

drastic effect of the embargo on the Japanese economy, Grew men
tioned

11 •

•

•

In Japan, a psychology of despair leads characteris

tically to a do or die reaction , ..

11

He concluded this note:

Th� position as we see it is that if our government
is still prepared to explore an approach from Japan, time
is of the essence.

TJ'lere would seem to be developm ents

in the making which if not immediately anticipated might
well eliminate the last possibility though slim it may be
2

of preventing the spread of the war to the Pacific . .

Grew actually �uestioned whether the United States desired to
negotiate .its differences with Japan.

that

Two days later, Grew noted

because of the American embargo and the lack of progress in

negotiations the Japanese people felt they must prepare for a war.
There was conscription, mobilization, air raid shelters built, and
rest:riction on travel. He noted that there was a campaign in Japan
to prepare for war if negotiations failed. 3

1

Ibid. , p. 395.

2

3

�., p. 398.

�., p. 409.
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On the same day, August 29, 1941, commenting on Washington's
publicity concerning Konoye' s peace offer, 1 Grew noted that this
underestimated the grave situation in Japan and placed Prince Konoye
ip an even more dangerous situation. Furthermore the American
ambassador stated that
. ..there can be no doubt as to the genuiness of the pre
sent efforts of Prince Konoye to find some mutual ground
for conciliation with a view to avoid the steadily increasing
risk of war . . 2
The following day, Grew pleaded with Washington to illustrate
to the Japanese that the United States desired better relations.3 The
policies of the United States were reflected by Roger Hornbeck
.. . Although we should take no unfair advantage, we
have everything to gain and little or nothing to lose by
standing firm on our principles and our policies . . .4

--- --

The s_tif_! at!itu��
towards Japan was not denied by Hornbeck nor was
'__
-it readily acceptable to Grew.

·-------

--- �---------

While no progress in negotiations was made in either China
or Washington, the Dutch and British sent warnings in the form of
harsh notes, indicating that if Japan made another advance militarily,
there would be no other recourse but war. Though there was no

1Reports of Japanese-American negotiations were released to
the press after the Japanese government demanded secret talks.

2 F. R. U. S., The Far East, IV, 409.
3rbid., p. 416.

4Ibid.,
p. 419.
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formal American, British, Chinese, and Dutch encirclement, this
did in fact happen with these four powers declaring that they would
not permit, for any reason, any further Japanese thrust.
President Roosevelt replied to Konoye I s offer of a personal
meeting in Honolulu by presenting a series of principles which must
be accepted before the proposed conversation could commence. 1
Hornbeck, commenting on a possible meeting of the two leaders,
felt t4at the Japanese had nothing to offer the United States.

He

cons�antly disregarded the sound advice of Grew, whose ten years
in Japan permitted him to accurately evaluate the Japanese position
in relation to the United States.

The proposed meeting was com

pared to the Munich Conference. 2 This was a false analogy as there
were two different nations involved and different matters at stake.
Hornbeck disregarded the build up of tensions in Japan because he
thought they were exaggerated, indicating a distrust of Grew, who
was on the spot and able to transmit numerous reliable data.
Chiang Kai-Shek, in an interview on September 10 in Chunl<i�g with representatives of the American press, officially
acknowledged the failure of Chinese-Japanese conversations by
announcing that China would continue to fight.

1
William Langer and Everett Gleason in their book The Unde
cla:i,-ed War, 1940-1941, stated that Stimson, Welles, and others were
against the meeting in varying degrees.

2

F. R. U. S. The Far East, IV, 424.
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C,:. E. Gauss, the United States Ambassador to China, wrote
to the Secretary of State, on September 14, 1941, the following:
. . . The announcement of the sending of the American
military mission to China was hailed as a definite indi
cation that appeasement was dead and that the United
States was p11epari�g for military and strategic colla"bor
ation with China extending even beyond material aid. 1
The__ �ontinuation of the war in China, the inflexibi_l_ity '!f the
Un�ted States, the imminent failure of the proposed Roosevelt· crease of pro-Axis
i;Jentiment and propaganda in Japan.

Grew rementioned that talk of

the fall of the Ko_n_oye government was near as the Japanese Premier

-�-------

had failed_to_solve the economic dilemma of Japan, 2 and he also
�otified Washington that on the twelfth of September the military

______________

command was centralized under the symbolic leadership of Emperor
.

Hirohito.

--

.

___,____

This move was to counteract the extremists and to com-

mence intense preparation in case of war. 3

Two and a half weeks

later, Ambassador Grew sent a telegram in which he reviewed
telegrams since the spring of 1940, which revealed an intensified
effo11t by Japan to bring about the meeting of the two heads of govern
ment.

Grew personally felt that the meeting might keep the situation

!rom goi�g from bad to worse.

If the Americans kept stalling, he

reiterated, it may lead to a military government.
1
2
3

Ibid. ,

P·

447.

Ibid.,

p.

441.

Ibic:l.,

p.

447.
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. . . I feel that we shall fail to reach our objectives if we
insii;t and continue to insist in the preliminary conversa
tion on the furpishing by Japan of the sort of specific,
clear-cut commitment which we would expect to see em
bodied in any formal and final degree of confidence in the
professed good faith and sincerity of intention of Prince
Konoye and his supporters . . . I do not believe that we
can Stlcceed in creating an orientation in Japan which
would lead to a general improvement in our relations and
the hope of avoiding ultimate war in the Pacific . . .1
Grew

mentioned in another telegram that his British colleague was

against

United States settling its disputes with Japan by negotiation. 2

On October 2, 1941, Secretary of State Hull replied to Grew' s
telegram

as if its contents were completely disregarded. In his

statement,

Hull reiterated that the United States government wanted

more than the word of the Japanese government. It wanted a showing of sincerity by some act such as the withdrawal from Indo-China.

------

Finaj.1¥-Prtsident Roose-v-e-1-t,----0'----e,._.advice of the Secretary of State,
------on October 2, 1941.3
rejected the idea of meeting with Prince Kono

----

On October 7, Prime Minister Konoye transmitted his view to

Grew

to the effect that:

1.

2.

The memorandum of October 2, 1941, was far from
conciliatory and places the Prime Minister in a diffi
cult position, as with the failure of negotiations, more
fuel was being added to his enemies and the army.
Many people in the Japanese government are coming
to the point of view that Japan has fallen into a trap.
As the Americans have no intention of reaching an

1rbid., pp. 488-89.
2

Ibid., p. 489.

3Ibid., p. 494.
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agreement with Japan, but rather they desire to keep
the Empire in a position of quasi-hostility.
The United States I notes tend to be argumentive and
great care was taken not to give Japan any specifica
tions or to lay any of their cards on the table. 1

3.

During September, little transpired in the negotiations.
September
Supreme

By

25, 1941, at a Liaison Conference held in Japan by the

Command and the cabinet, it was decidec:1. that ti;:;-decision--

for war or

must be made b October 15 at the latest.

strict a�herence

to the September plan upset Konoye to such an

_ _ _..--

The

that he talked of resigning, although he was partly responsible,

e�tent

for he gave

his consent to the September Plan.

He was dealt a severe

blow when the ,American government again rejected a meeting be
tween himself and President Roosevelt. 2
When the navy became hesitant on October 12 about committing
Japan

to war and when Konoye and Foreign Minister Toyada could

not offer the assurance of a peaceful solution through negotiations,
�ojo 1:1tated that Japan recognized the principle of withdrawing the
troops from China with neither indemnities nor annexation.

But the

United States' demand for unconditional and immediate withdrawal
not be in keeping with the dignity (ishin) of the army.

"would
became

11

As it

clear that Tojo dominated the cabinet meetings and the plan

1Ibid. , p. 501.
�

2Butow, Tojo and the Coming of the War, p. 262-63.
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of September 6 was instituted, the diplomats had little time or room
to negotiate. 1
As a result of the American attitude and the internal situation
in Japan, Premier Konoye and his cabinet resigned at 8: 15 p. m . on
.

October 16, 1941. 2

1

--�----------- ------- -··

Ibid., p. 273.

2F. R. U. S. , The F ar East, IV, 5 11.
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CHAPTER V

THE TOJO GOVERNMENT PLANS FOR PEACE
AND WAR AND THE BREAKDOWN OF NEGOTIATIONS
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN

When PriI_?-_c.=.K
ye
d
_ <:>�
_ o
_ _ _a_z::_ _his cabinet resigned on October 16,
the choice of h_i!:3 _§}lCCe_�so_F _was_ lim_it_�_c! to either
----War_�_
-- j_p_is_t�r Tojo
_f)r !'I� _Minister Qjkawa� Tojo was summoned to the palace where

1

Emperor Hirohito asked him to form a cabinet without being bound
to the Imperial Conference's decision of September 6, 1941, which

essentially approved preparation for war in mid-October if peace
negotiations failed. 1 By October 17 his cabinet was completed and

-----

the formal ceremony took place on the following day. 2
Shigenori Togo accepted the post of Foreign Minister in the
Tojo cabinet for the purpose of averting, not starting a war.

Toyada,

the form_�r Foreign Minister, and Tojo admitted that within Japanese
circles, the army was stilUh._e_main g��to negotiations. 3
There were different reactions among American officials con
cerning the new Tojo government.
member of Admiral Stark's

Captain R . E. Schuriman, a

staff, felt that there was no radical

1Butow, Tojo and the Coming of the War, p. 293,
2
3

Ibid., p. 312.

Togo, p. 55.
66

67
change in Japanese policy forthcoming.1 Chief of the Division of
Far Eastern Affairs Maxwell Hamilton assessed the Tojo cabinet as
middle of the road. He iterated that Japan's mostJ.mp.or..ta-nt--pr--0.bl.ems___
were to secure oil and ferrous material and to break the economic
and commercial embargoes of Japan by the ABCD powers.

He felt

that Japan would not reject a negotiated settlement, but at the same
time if peace was not forthcoming

11 •

•

•

the opportunity for a solu-

tion by force will not be lost through lack of preparation or deploy
ment of forces. 11 2 Hamilton proposed eight points for a negotiated
settlement but these were not presented to Japanese representatives.
They were;
1.
2.
3,
4.
, 5.
6.

7.
8.

To charter Japanese merchant ships in exchange for
cotton and non-military commodities.
To furnish Japan with steel in exchange for delivered
ships.
To buy goods from Japan required by the United States.
To barter non-military commodities with Japan.
To indicate to Japan, the importance of good relations.
To resume the sending of American vessels to Far
Eastern ports,
To send some prominent American such as Bernard
Baruch or Thomas Lamont to Japan.
To dispatch a professional baseball team to Japan. 3

Bishop James E.. Walsh, . referring to the shift in government,
. atated that Japan wanted peace but if peace were to be preserved an
agreement must l;>e reached witho�t 9-elay, as the new government
1

Butow, Tojo and the Coming of the War, p. 313.

2F. R. U. S., The Far
East , IV, 522-23.
3Ibid. ,

p. 524.
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was putting its house in 0rder to move in another direction if peace
did not come.1
Concerning the removal of troops from China and Indo-China,
Ambassador Grew explained, on October 25, that
. . . these $ame leaders are confident that provided Japan
is nc;>t placed in 9-n impossible position by the insistance on
the part of the United States, that all Japanese troops in
these areas be withdrawn at once, such a removal can and
will be successfully effected .. . Th.ere is a good possibllity
of a reorientation of Japanese policy.2
•
The infle�ible attitude of the United States was reflected by the
Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, who was quoted as saying that the

American gov�rnrnent was satisfied that the Japanese planned more
expansion anc;l war.

The statement upset Grew because Knox went

to tl;ie public and presented fallacious information that the Japanese
were expanding, without mentioning Grew' s clarification that the new
l�aders in To).<yo were trying to bridge the gap between the United
States and Japan.3 Another United States policy-maker said, in a
manner contradicting the American Ambassador.
. Witl;i the removal of Prince Konoye as Prirne Minister
in October, 1941, and the appointment of General Tojo as
1
Ibid., p. 527.
2

Foreign Re�ations of the United States, Japan, II, 697-98,
quoted in Hans Louis Trefousse, ed., What Happened at Pearl Har
bor: Docu�ents Pertaining to the Japanese Attack of December 7,
1941 and its Background, (New York: Twayne P1.+blishers, 1958),
i:>- 293.
3 F. R. U. S., The Far East,
IV, 553.
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his successor, any possibility of such negotiations vanished.
From that time on the die had been cast . .. l
Sumner Welles rejected Grew' s opinion as valid even though
Grew had been :i.n Japan for ten years. Hull's aide constantly and
unreliably misinterpreted Japanese attempts to reach a negotiated
settlement.
Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, judging the situation in
Washington, wrote in October 1941, in his diary about the trend of
events concerning Japan.
For a long time I have believed that our best entrance
into war would be by Japan ...Japan has no friends in
this country, but China has. And of course if we go to war
against Ja an, it will inevitably lead us into war against
�
Germany.
United States Ambaesador to Britain John Winant, stressed
to ffull the w�rning of a surprise attack a;nd also conveyed plans for
intergovernmental
consultation in the Pacific. 3
,,
Grew mentioned that upon the failure of a peace program,
armed conflict would be unavoidable and it would come with dramatic
suddenness. His November 3, 1941, note from Tokyo also stressed
the element of an imminent surprise attack from Japan.4 Originally
Tojo did not become Premier to lead Japan into war, but if he failed
1s-u,�ner Welles, The Time for Decision (New York and London:
Harper's BrQs., 1944), p. 295.
2
Quoted in Neumann, p. 282.
3

F, R. U. S., The Far East, IV, 525.

4 Trefousse,

p.298.
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to break the deadlock of indecision,

11 •

•

•

he was prepared to

assu;rne the leader ship of the nation in war. 111
The remainder of October was used by the Japanese to review
- ..

national policy.

---�-----

-- �----- ---·-

was the main factor in the decision to go to war.
three

--------

The oil needs for the militar -industriaLco.mplex
By October 30

alternative courses of action were presented by policy-makers

··-----·-

in Japan as follows:
1.
2.
3.

·- ---- --

A policy of caution at the expense of great hardships
at home.
An immediate launching of hostilities.
Further diplomatic effort with simultaneous preparation
for war.

Plan 1, aimed at avoiding armed conflict, was rejected because
the liquid fuel stock would be depleted in two years and the Japanese
military force would grind to a halt. Being equivalent to military
suicide, this plan was discarded. Tojo opposed Plan 2 as it ran
counter to the Emperor I s pleas of searching for peace through negoti
ations.

\\

I

Plan 3 was the accepted compromise, with a deadline for war

to be established if a diplomatic victory was not achieved.2 The deadline for the successful conclusion of negotiations was set for Novemher 30, 1941.

Formal confirmation of the new policy took place at an

Imperial Conference which was held on the fifth of November. 3
1Quoted in Butow, Tojo and the Coming of the War, p. 313.
2Ibid., pp. 319-20.
3rbid.
, pp. 321-25.
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to Washington to aid Admiral Nomura who requested aid because of
-- --

.

---·-

----------- ---

his lack of diplomatic experience.
·-

.

---------

Tokyo wrote to Nomura that

-· -- ----- -- ------------·

Kurusu 1 s mission was

to convey in person to you information concerning the
latest sttuation here, to assist you in the final stages of
negotiations, and by cooperating with you to break the
deadlock so as to bring negotiations speedily to a successful
conclusion. 1
At the International Military Tribunal for the Far East after
World War II, Tojo testified that
there was no design whatsoever to camouflage Japan's
intentions if any, to start war. It came purely from
the wish to bring negotiations to a successful conclusion.
But whatever Japan's intention it worked in the United States I favor
as the Kurusu Mission prolonged negotiations and permitted more
American preparation.

"To the Japanese a delay in hostilities was

not a gain, but a loss. 11 2
Important officials in the State Department were aware of
Kurusu I s intentions incoming to Washington by means of "Magic11
which was the term used to identify decoded intercepted messages
from Japan.

The Navy had broken the Japanese code and messages

sent from the Foreign Minister in Tokyo to Washington were intercepted by the office of Naval Intelligence.

Therefore the United

lQuoted in Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, "Kurusu' s Mission and the
Abortive Modus Vivendi, 11 Journal of Modern History, XXIV, (September,
1952), p. 303.
2

rbid. , p. 304.
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States government knew many of Japan's proposals and plans before

they were presented by the Japanese envoys to the State Department.
While Kurusu journeyed to Washington the Japanese Ambas .:.
�
sador,-Adrr:iral Nomura presented a proposal to the Secretary of

?

It provided for: the withdrawal of Japanese troops from

State.

\
Indo-China after successful negotiations; withdrawal within two years/
I
frorp China, except North China, Inner Mongolia, and Hainan Island/
and recognition by Japan of the principle of economic non
discrimination. 1 Hull discarded the proposal when he found out that

it was a bargaining document for the proposal which was to be presented on November 20, five days after Kurusu arrived in Washington.

Dispatch #736 sent from Tokyo and intercepted by Intelligence
in Washington on November 5, 1941, asked the Japanese envoy to
complete an agreement by the twenty-fifth of November. 2 On the
following day, the State Department received a message from Grew\
that Japan's economic situation was deteriorating and that the Japan- \
\
ese were planning to seize raw materials, notably oil, tin, and
rubber if peace failed. 3
Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operation, wrote two days after
the deadline was set that

1Ibid., p. 04.
3
2Husband E. Kimmel, Admiral Kimmel' s Story (Chicago:
Henry Regnery Co., 1955), p. 89.
3

F. R. U. S., The Far East, IV, 571.
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. . . Events are moving rapidly towards a real showdown
in both the Atlantic and the Pacific. The navy is already
in the war in the Atlantic, but the country doesn't realize
it. Apathy, to the point of open opposition, is evident in
a c;:onsiderable section of the press. Meanwhile the Senate
is dragging out the debate with reference to arming merchant
men. Whether this country knows it or not we are at war. 1
On November 9, Winston Churchill publicly stated at a Lord
Mayor's banquet, that if the United States should find herself engaged
in a war with Japan, Great Britain would follow within the hour. 2
On the next day Japan's Foreign Minister Togo mentioned in his talks
w.ith Grew, that it was felt that if the United States did not cease
imposing economic pressure, Japan might have to resort to some
action for self-defense. 3
Meanwhile, the State Department in Washington received a
"Magic" dispatch on November 11 emphasizing the date of Novem
ber 25 as absolutely immovable.

"You can see therefore that the

situation is reaching a climax, and that time is indeed becoming
short. 11 4
At this point, the United States leaders knew that the Japanese
were totally backed up to the wall.

The parallel communications of

August, by the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands,
stated that they would not tolerate any other territorial acquisition
1Quoted in Beard, p. 431.
2Hull, II, 1059.

3
4

Trefousse, p. 300.
Quoted in Kimmel, p. 90.

74
by Japan.

At best, the United States knew that Japan was to move in

South East Asia, if negotiations failed.
On November 13, 1941, Secretary of State Hull received a re
port from the American Embassy in Tokyo stating that Japan was
under strain and her economic structure could not withstand it. 1
Two days later, Tokyo informed Admiral Nomura and Saburo
Kurusu, who had just arrived from Japan, that the date for reaching
an agreement was immovable. 2 On November 16, 1941, Foreign
Mi?1-ister Togo wrote to the Washington Embassy:
. have read your # 1090 and you may be sure that you
have all my gratitude for the efforts you have put forth,
but the fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread
of a few days so please fight harder than you ever did .

3

These secret codes, which the Japanese Vl.'.ere not aware that
the Americans were decoding, displayed an apparent sincerity in
salvaging negotiations while the Americans aware of Japanese pur-

poses, were adamant and unyielding.
On November 17, 1941, Grew emphasized

11

•

•

•

the need to

guard against any sudden Japanese naval or military actions in such
areas as are now involved in the Chinese theater . . . 11 He talked of

new action in Siberia and the Southwest Pacific.

He felt that the Em-

bassy 1 s duty was to watch for signs of military operations and that

1 F. R. U. S., The Far East , IV, 59.
2Kimmel, p. 90.
3
Quoted in Kimmel, p, 91.
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II

every precaution is being taken to guard against surprise
The s�me day Foreign Minister Togo appealed for peace, while

---

c1,sking f9r g�eater �obilization.

Meanwhile in Washington, Secretary

of the Treasury Morgenthau showed how the United States has not
changed her policy.

Without defining raw material concessions, the

American government wanted from Japan: restoration of China; one
billion yen indemnity for reconsititution of China; and the sale to the
United States of part of the Japanese navy. 2 The Chief of the Divi-

sion for Far Eastern Affairs Maxwell Hamilton sent Morgenthau' s
proposal to Hull as follows:
1.
2,
3.
4.

Withdrawal from China and Indo-•China;
Withdrawal from Manchuria;
Sale of fifty percent of the Japanese navy to the United
States in exchange for raw materials.
Negotiation of a non-aggression pact. 3

On November 20, 1941, aside from their suggestion of a modus vivendi, the Japanese representatives in Washington presented a
proposal which constituted further major concessions by Japan to
reach peace.
1.

2.

The government of Japan and that of the United States
undertake not to make any advancement in Southeast
Asia and the Pacific except in Inda-China where
Japanese troops are now stationed.
Japan will withdraw from Inda-China upon the estab
lishment of peace in the Pacific and in the peace talks,
they shall move the troops from southern Inda-China
to northern Inda-China.

1Quoted in Trefousse, p. 302.
2F. R. U. S., The Far East ,
IV, 606-13.
3

Ibid. , p. 623.
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3. The government of Japan and the United States shall
cooperate to acquire goods and commodities which
the two countries need from the Dutch East Indies.
4. This stipulation refers to restoration of trade rela
tions and the supplying of Japan required quantities
of oil.
5. The government of the United States should refrain
from taking measures which will be prejudiced to
the restoration of peace between Japari and China.1
The Japanese coded messages sent to Nomura two days later
stated that it was difficult to extend the deadline beyond November 25.
"There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we want to
settle Japanese-American relations by the twenty-fifth ..."_ but
Togo stat�� tha! � �our-day extension until_Novemb_e.r 2-9-would �--.
_ - _
_
gr��,;�d.

"This time we mean it, the deadline can't be absolutely

changed.

After that things are automatically going to happen.112

During this eritical period in negotiations, as a reply to the
November 20 proposals presented by Kurusu and Nomura, American
officials toyed with the idea of a proposed modus vivendi with Japan.

Six months before, President Roosevelt had conceived.of a plan
which would enable the United States and Japan to resume economic
relations.

In exchange Japan would restrict troops in Indo-China

and Manchukuo; would not invoke the Tripartite Pact if the United
States entered the European war; and would conduct peace talks initi
ated by American representatives.3 In November the Far Eastern

1
0uoted in Trefousse, p.303.
2Quoted in Kimmel, p. 91.

3 Hsu, p. 305.
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Division of the Department of State proposed:

1.
2.
3.
4.

5.
6.
7.

Direct negotiations between Japan and China.
During negotiations, Japan declare an armistice.
During negotiations no Japanese reinforcements
in China or Indo-China.
During negotiations no Jap�nese shipments of military
supplies.
During negotiations no United States shipments of mili
tary supplies to China.
Immediate negotiations on resumption of trade and
commerce on trade commodities.
And after a Sino-Japanese peace, the United States
was to resume normal trade relations. 1

However, final draft of a proposed modus vivendi with Japan was ready

by November 22, 1941.

Originally Secretary of State Hull favored the

proposal even if it only stalled the beginning of the war.

The terms

included:
1.
2.
�
3.

4.

An affirmation of peaceful intentions by both govern
ments.
A promise by both governments not to advance by force
or threat of force into areas including Southeastern or
Northeastern Asia or in the Southern or in the Nqrthern
Pacific areas.
An undertaking by Japan to withdraw its armed forces
from southern French Indo-China and to reduce the
total of her forces in French Indo-China to the number
which was there on July 26, 1941, and not to send
additional forces to Indo-China for replacement.
An undertaking by the United States to relax the freez
ing order to the following extent;
a) Imports from Japan to be freely permitted--two
thirds of it to be raw silk--and American goods frozen
in Japan to be forwarded to the United States.
b) Exports from the United States to Japan:
i) Bunkers and supplies for vessels engaged in the trade
here provided for.
ii) Food supplies not in shortage in the United- States.

1Ibid.

, p. 305.
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iii) Raw cotton to the extent of six hundred thousand
dollars per month.
iv) Medical supplies.
v) Petroleum: to be supplied on monthly basis for
civilian use only, such as for the fishing industry,
the transport system, etc. The amount of petroleum
would be decided upon after consultations with the
governments of Britain and the Netherlands. The
above amount may be increased later.
An undertaking by Japan to relax freezing and export
restrictions on the United States.
An undertaking by the United States to ask Australia,
Britain, and the Netherlands to take similar measures.
Any Japanese talks with China to be based on peace,
order, and justice.
This modus vivendi to remain in force for three months
with an understanding that an extension would be in
order after a general settlement is reached. 1

5.
6.
7.
8.

The conceived proposal would have been the first concrete attempt for
pea�e.

The liberal terms might have permitted Japan to have a most

favored nation status concerning trade with the United States and to
allow for ways in which Japan could possibly withdraw from the war
in China.
On November 22 Hull informed the diplomatic representative

of China, Britain, the Netherlands, and Australia of the proposed mo
dus vivendi.

Britain and the Netherlands gave superficial approval

but China's reaction was violent,

Hu Shih, the Chinese Ambassador

to the United States, felt that the retention of twenty-five thousand

Japanese soldiers (the amount of soldiers there on July 25, 1941) in
French Indo-China was a threat to China.

There was no provision

for the end of the conflict between Japan and China.
1F. R. U. S., The Far East,
IV, 662-64.
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wired his brother-in-law T. V. Soong, who was in Washington, that
if the embargo is relaxed

11 •

•

•

the morale of the entire people of

China will collapse ... The Chinese army will collapse.11 1
Because of the pressure Secretary of State Hull reported to
Pre11ident Roosevelt that:
In view of the opposition of the Chinese government and
the half-hearted support of the actual support of the
British, the Netherlands, and Australian governments
and in view of the wide publicity of the opposition ...I
desire very earnestly to recommend that at this time I
•..withhold the modus vivendi proposal.
When the President approved Hull's recommendation, the modus
vivendi was shelved.2
After the modus vivendi was withheld, Secretary of State Hull,
aware of the November 29 deadline stated:

11

The Sword of Damocles

that hung over our heads was therefore attached to a clock work set
to the hour." On the next day, Nov.�mber 25, 1941, Hull stated:
There is practically no possibility of an agreement being
;,1.chieved with Japan ...It would be a mistake to assume
that our conversations are going on.3
On the same day, Secretary of War Stimson referred to the
counter ptoposal which Hull was to present the following day as a re
ply to Japan's proposal of November 20 that"· ..I don't think there
10uoted in Hsu, pp. 305-06.
2rbid ., pp. 306-07.
3

Quoted in Hull, p. 1077.
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is any chance of the Japanese accepting it because it was so
drastic . . . 111

General George Marshall and Admiral Stark were

opposed to Hull's ten point proposal for fear it would cause Japan to
commence war. 2
Secretary of State Hull handed the outline for the proposed
agreement between the United States and Japan, to Ambassadors Nu
mura and Kurusu on November 26. Section one provided for four
principles of peace:
1,
2.
3.
4.

Principles of inviolability of territorial integrity
and sovereignty of each and all nations.
Principle of non-interference in other countries'
internal affairs.
Principle of equality between nations.
Principle of reliance on international coo·peration
and conciliation.

Section two proposed steps to be taken by the governments of Japan
and the United States.
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

..

Mulilateral non-aggression pact with Great Britain,
China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union,
Thailand, and the United States.
Pledge to respect territorial rights of Indo-China.
The government of Japan to withdraw all military,
naval, air, and police forces from China and Indo
China.
Sole recognition of the National .Government of China,
temporarily at Chunking.
Both the United States and Japan to negotiate a trade
agreement.
Both the United States and Japan to give up all extra
territorial rights in China.

1Quoted in Trefousse, p. l39.

2Richard Van Alstyne, "Before Pe;1.rl Harbor, 11 Current Hi$tory,
XX, (February, 1951), 76.
.
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7.
8.
9.
10.

Both nations shall respectively remove restrictions
on assets in respective countries.
Stabilization of the dollar-yen rate.
No treaty with a power which would affect this pro
posal.
Both the United States and Japan to work to the
applicability of this proposal.1

When Hull presented this proposal to the Ambassadors, Kurusu men
tioned that his government would throw up its hands. 2
The Secretary of State said to the British Ambassador:
II

The diplomatic part of our relations with Japan was virtually

over and that the matter will now go to the officials of the army and
the navy . . .

11

'

and that the Secretary of State knew war was imminent. 3

After receiving Hull's answer to proposal B, Nomura and Kurusu
tried to use it as a basis of negotiation by proposing to their government
that a top-level conference be held between Vice-President Wallace
or White House Advisor Harry Hopkins and ex-Premier Konoye or
Viscount Ishii, possible in Honolulu.

The idea of further negotiations

was rejected in accordance with Plan 3, which the Japanese Imperial
Conference adopted on November 5, 1941. 4
When the American Office of Naval Intelligence intercepted
Togo's message sent to the Japanese embassy, important officials knew
that relations would be defacto ruptured. The coded message stated:
1
F. R. U. S., The Far East, IV, 637-40, 645-46.
2
Beard., p. 137.
3

Quoted in Beard, p. 24 7.

4Butow, Tojo and the Coming of the War, pp. 338-39.

Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted super
human efforts but in spite of this, [Japanese Ambassadors'
effort] the United States has gone ahead and presented
this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected
and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can
by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. There
fore, with a report of the view of the Imperial Government
on this American proposal which I will send you in two or
three days, the negotiations will be defacto ruptured.
This is inevitable . . . 1
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Since leaders in Tokyo felt that Hull's proposal would actually
reduce their country to a third-rate power and since "Japan could get
po relief short of surrender of her fundamental position, she chose
2
Formal confirmation for war took place on November 30
war. 11

when the Japanese government called an Imperial Conference which
"linked the fate of the nation to the use of force." Tojo stated that
the United States added new conditions and called for unilateral concessions from Japan such as withdrawal of troops from China, repudi
ation of the Wang Ching- wei government, and minimizing the Tri
partitie Pact.

Submission would mean the forfeiting of Japan's power

and authority.

After all the cabinet ministers and Admiral Nagano,

reporting for the army and navy, had made their reports to the
Emperor supporting the Prime Minister, the decision for war was

-

informed the Emperor
made. 3 On December 2, 1941, Admiral- Nagano
- --- -

.

--

--

--

that
7 was set for the simultallfil)J.l..S_a.t.t..a..clss on Pearl Harbor
----December
---- -�- --

-----

1Quoted in Kimmel, p. 93.
2van Alstyne, p. 76.
3

Butow, Tojo and the Coming of the War, p. 359.
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and other targets.

On Sunday, which was a day of rest, the number
�

of war ships in harbor would be comparatively large. 1
In Washington, Secretary of War Stimson felt that an attack
on British and Dutch possessions in the Southwest Pacific would require the United States' participation in a war against Japan.

On

November 25 and November 28, policy-makers prepared a diplomatic manoeuver as a warning to Japan, and a political manoeuver, as
a message to Congress and the people.

Both the dispatch and ad-

dress declared that any southward advance by Japan would invade
America's vital interest which was the same as an attack on Ameri-

'

tan soil.

2

Washington wrote to Commander of the Asiatic Fleet Hart that
Great Britain would be assured of American support in the eventuality
of a Japanese attack on British possessions. 3

Also the War Depart-

ment in London wrote to Brock Popham, the British representative in
Manila, that there were assurances of United States armed support
if Japan attacked either British and or Dutch possessions.

4

Since the policy-makers in the State Department and in the
Roosevelt cabinet accepted the prospects of war rather than negotiations

1Ibid.

, p. 3 70.

2
Richard N. Current,
Japanese,

11

"How Stimson Meant to Manoeuver the

Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XV, (June, 1953), 71.

3 Beard, p. 541.
4
Kimmel, p. 114.
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via a modus vivendi, the main theme of American policy was to derive a plan which would both unite the country in a war with Japan and
G�rmany and would make the Japanese the aggressors in war.

While

Nomura and Kurusu had conversations with the State Department,
Secretary of State Hull knew that negotiations we.re defacto ruptured
since November 28, 1941.

While the cabinet knew that war would be--

gin any day, nothing could be done to prevent an attack.

Secretary

of War Stimson stated that:
In spite of the risk involved, however, in letting the Japan•
ese fire the first shot, we realized that in order to have
the full support of the Amer lean people it was desirable to
make sure that the Japanese be the one to do this so that
there would remain no doubt in anyone I s mind as to who
was the aggressor. 1
Up until forty-eight hours before Japan's attack, the possibility and probability of war appeared inevitable.

If there was any doubt

•
that there would be a war, it was eliminated b y the message sent from
Tokyo to Washington, December 6, 1941, mentioning that a separate
fourteen point memorandum was to be sent the next day.

American

Army and Navy Intelligence deciphered a thirteen point message
sometime early Saturday afternoon or evening which stated:
The American Government obsessed with its own views and
opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of
the war . . . it is exercising in conjunction with Great
Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Re
course to such pressure as a means of dealing with inter-
national relations should be condemned as it is at times
more inhumane than military pressure . . . It is a fact of
1Quoted in Current, p. 169.
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•

history that the countries [of East Asia for the past hun
dred years or more ] have been compelled to observe the
status quo under Anglo-American policy of imperialistic
exploitation and to sacrifice themselves to the pros
perity qf the two nations ...1

The tone of the first thirteen points definitely established, unofficially,

that a state of war existed at any moment. On this night; as much as
eleven hours before the attack, Washington was, notified of the critical
condition. On Satur�ay evening between

9 p.m and 10 p .. m.the

thirt�en-part message was brought to.--Roosevelt who read the thirteen
p�rts to his guest Harry Hopkins and said "This means war."

Com

mander Shultz described the conversation as follows:

... Mr. Iiopkins, then expressed a view that since war
was undoubt�bly going to come at the convenience of the
Japal)ese, it was too bad that we could not strike the first
blpw and prevent any sort of surprise. The President
nodded and then said in effect, 'No, we can't do that. We
are a democracy and a peaceful people.' Then he raised
his voice and this much I remember definitely, he said,
'But, we have a good record.1
The impression I got was that we would have to
stand on that record, we could not make the fir st overt
move, we would have to wait until it came ...2
On J;>ecember 7, 1941, President Roosevelt sent a plea for
peace to Emperor Hirohito which arrived after the Japanese fleet advaJiced on their targets.3

Between 4 a.m.and 6 a.m. on the same

$�:n,day in W�shipgton, part fourteen of the Japanese message #902,

which was decoded, stated in part:
1
Quoted in Kimmel, p. 102.
2

Quoted in Sherwood, pp. 426-27.

3 F. R. U. S., The Far East, IV, 723.

�
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. . . The Japanese government regrets to have to notify
hereby the American government that in view of the
attitude of the American government it cannot but consi
der that it is impossible to reach an agreement through
further negotiations. 1
The fourteen-part message was to be presented at 1 p. m., December 7,
1941, to the State Department and the decoding machines in the Japanese
Embassy were destroyed by the staff. 2

However Ambassador Nomura

and Kurusu submitted the _message to Cordell Hull at the State Depart ...
ment at two o'clock, an hour after the simultaneous Japanese attacks
on Southeast Asia, the Philippines and Pearl Harbor.
At ten o'clock in the moring, three hours before the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor, Captain Kramer of Naval Intelligence brought
the intercepted fourteenth part of the Japanese message to Secretary
of State Hull's office where Secretary of War Stimson and Secretary
of the Navy were present.
war was near

11 •

•

•

These policy-makers in Washington knew

and Mr. Hull said he was certain that the Japanese

were planning some deviltry and we were all wondering where the
blow would strike. 113
At one o'clock Washington time, a Japanese task force of
twenty-three vessels including six aircraft carriers conducted a suc
cessful surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, 4 causing twenty-eight

1

Quoted in Rear Admiral Robert Theobald, The Final Secret
of Pearl Harbor (New York: Devin Adair, 1954), p. 75.

3
Quoted in Trefousse, p. 135.
4okumiya, p. 301.
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hundred American casualties while destroying or damaging the major
portion of the United States Pacific. fleet. 1
The attitude summing up the American government's opinion
was expressed by Robert Sherwood at three o'clock on December 7,
1941, when President Roosevelt called in Secretary Hull, Stimson,
Knox, as well as Admiral Stark and General Marshall for a
conference.
The Conference met in not too tense an atmosphere
because I think that all of us believed . . . the enemy was
Hitler and that he could never be defeated without force of
arms; that sooner or later we were bound to be in war and
that Japan had given us an opportunity. Everyone however
agreed on the seriousness of the war and that it would be a
long, hard struggle. 2

1 Trefousse, p. 5.
2

2 Sherwood, p. 431.

CONCLUSION
There are many reasons the United States took a strong stand
towards Japan in 1941.

Germany was the main threat to the Western

democracies whereas Japan was of secondary importance.

While

Germany was conquering the European democracies, Japan acquired

territories which were auxillary to the European nations.

But

Japan's military expansion did, in fact, represent a threat to the
Western Allies.

It appears that Japan was conciliatory in her de

mands towards the United States and that the conciliation stemmed
from Japan's powerful position in the Far East.

However, it can be

assumed that the object of Japan's reaching an agreement with the
United States we.s to safeguard some of the fruits of Nipponese expansion and tq restore normal trade relations.

Japanese attempts for a

rapproachment with the United States were neither altruistic nor
submissive.

At the end of the negotiations she was placed in the

difficult position of either completely acquiescing to the United States'
demands in exchange for economic benefits or going to war.

She chose

the latter.
The United States was also in a precarious position.

A declar-

ation of war without a provocative act, would have split the country

because of the strong isolationist sentiment.

On the one hand, Ger-

many' s quick victories in Europe had aroused grave concern.
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While
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the United States was supplying economic aid to Britain and her allies
through Lend-Lease and other acts, she was not fully united in a
desire to declare war on Germany, and even if the President and his
cabinet had gone to Congress to ask for a declaration of war, it is
doubtful that the latter would have given its approval.

Since Germany

had avoided a confrontation with the United States, the latter waited for
something to occur in the Atlantic.
Since invasion of Manchuria (Manchukuo ), the United States 1
relationship with Japan was strained and when Japan invaded China
and signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany, the relations went from
bad to worse.

This pact, designed to keep the Americans out of the

European or Chinese War, did the opposite as it linked the destinies
of Japan and Germany.

Economically, the United States had is-sued

a series of restrictive embargoes on raw materials going to Japan,
which was climaxed in July 1941, with the freezing of Japanese asset
in America after the Japanese military moved into southern Indo
China.

Because of this, Japan was faced with either acquiescing to

the United States or expanding, which meant war.

The attempts to

reach an agreement with the United States failed.
American policy-makers in the United States favored a strong
stand against Japan.

While in the earlier part of 1941, Japanese

Plenipotentiary representative and the State Department explored a
11

Draft Understanding" which the United States rejected after Japan

invaded southern Indo--China.

The embargo, the support of Chiang

90
Kai-Shek 1 s war in China, and the parallel notes after the Atlantic Conferenc� were i�dications of American policy.

In the last minute

negotiations in November, 1941, while the Executive branch and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff were aware of the Japanese decoded messages
which indicate� the imminenc� of war, they did not present conciliatory proposals to the Japanese Ambassadors.

A last minute proposal

was presented, which the Japanese interpreted as an ultimatum.
From that moment on the United States waited for war, aware
that if Japan was at war, Germany would also be at war with the
United States.

While she knew that an attack was to occur, the United

States could not make the initial attack because in a democratic nation,
the government was responsible to the people and the people would not
condone such an act.

But with the assault at Pearl Harbor, the

country became united and prepared to fight the Axis powers.

The

attack, although not expected at Pearl Harbor, and the declaration of
war by Japan and Germany, provided the reasons for a United States
declaration of war.

Nathaniel Peffer, a Far Eastern publicist, wrote

that Pearl Harbor was "neither an accident nor a coincidence, but
wholly in the logic of American history.

Pearl Harbor was an effect

not a cause. 1
George Kennan a former noted ambassador and diplomatic
historian clearly summed up the American government's attitude towards Japan in the period between the two world wars.
1 Ne�mann, p. 289.

Japan was the

,,/
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target of diplomi:l,tic pressures as the United States refused to dis
�uss specific arrangem�nts and acted with reluctance to suggest
or to ta�e responsibility for p�actical alt�rnatives to the courses of
actions which they opposed.

The bulk of diplomatic activity was

d�signed
. to d�fl�ct other powers notably Japa�, frpm the pur
suit of specific action we did not like. Rarely could we be
lured into fl. qi!:!cussicin of the real quantities involved: of
such problems as Japap.1 s expanding population, or the weak
ness of government in China . . . we hacked away . . . at
the positions of the other countries . . . above all the Japan
e1;1e, in the unsh�keable belief, that if our principles were
commendable, their consequences could not be other than
happy an<;l accpetable . . . I can only say that if there was a
posaibility that the course of events might have been altered
. . , it must be admitted that we did very little to exploit
this pos13ibility. 1
In conclusion, American policy toward Japan was designed
either to make Japan accept the loss of all the Japanese had won by
armed conquest since 1931 or go to war.

When war was the c;>rder of

the day, the United States policy-makers were not altogether sorry
as it provided t�e Upited States with the opportunity of defeating
Germany and Japan.

1Kennan, pp. 45..,.4�,
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